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COMMENT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO TRIAL BY
JURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPOSITION
OF MONEY PENALTIES
Each year, Congress and the state legislatures are confronted with
the difficult task of designing government programs that can manage
the complex problems facing our society. With increasing frequency,
the legislative powers have responded to this challenge by delegating
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies developed to cope with
the complexities of a given policy area. This legislative delegation of
power is often accompanied by statutory money penalties that can be
imposed for violations of administrative regulations.1
Today, executive agencies annually initiate thousands of proceed-
ings which result in the imposition of civil money penalties.2 Many of
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Irey 1], aff'd en banc, 519 F.2d at 1215 (3d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Irey II],
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458 (1976);
Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 1458 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Atlas Roofing];
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958) [hereinafter cited as K. DAviS];
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965) [hereinafter cited
as L. JAFFE];
5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as J. MOon ];
H. GOLDSCHMm, REPORT IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION 72-6: AN EVALUATION
OF THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL USE OF CVIL MONEY PENALTIES AS A SANCTION BY
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1972) [hereinafter cited as H.
GOLDSCHMID].
1. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1161(f) (2) (1970);
id. § 1319 (Supp. II 1972); Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801, 819
(1970). For a catalogue of federal money penalty provisions, see H. GOLDSCHMID 957-
64 (Appendix A).
2. In 1971, seven executive departments and thirteen administrative agencies initi-
ated more than 60,000 actions for money penalties, see H. GOLDSCHMID 953-54 (Appen-
dix A, Chart II), and collected well in excess of $10 million, see id. at 955-56 (Appendix
A, Chart IID. See also id. at 902 (Dep't of Agriculture handled over 1357 cases and
collected more than $846,500 in fiscal year 1970).
More recently, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et
seq. (1970), the Department of Labor has issued about 67,000 citations which allege
over 33,000 violations during the first 2 1/3 years of enforcement. These citations
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these penalties are imposed by executive officers on the basis of their
own findings of fact after administrative hearings where jury trials are
normally not constitutionally required.' In most of these proceedings,
any question of a right to trial by jury is satisfied by provision for a de
novo trial in federal court on application of the losing party.4 However,
Congress has granted more and more agencies the power to impose
money sanctions subject only to limited judicial review. 5 With the
growing number of cases being heard by these agencies and the recent
recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States
that judicial review of other administrative adjudications be similarly
limited,0 it is important to determine how far Congress may go in
limiting defendants' rights to trial by jury by delegating adjudicative
authority to the executive branch.
carried proposed penalties of almost $9 million. See Comment, The Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970: An Overview, 9 GONZAOA L. REv. 477, 491 (1974). For a
discussion of OSHA, see notes 19-39 infra and accompanying text.
3. K. DAvis § 8.16.
4. H. GOLDSCHMD 907, 936; L. JAFFE 99; see, e.g., Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. H9 1251, 1319(b) (Supp. 1976); Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. H§ 801, 819(a)(3)-(4) (1970).
5. At least five federal agencies now have statutory authority to impose money
penalties subject to only limited judicial review. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8
U.S.C. H9 1221(d), 1223(d), 1227(c), 1229-30, 1281, 1284-86, 1321-23 (1970); Federal
Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1425a(d) (1970); Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16
U.S.C. § 668(b) (Supp. III, 1973); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540a (Supp.
1974); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. H§ 660, 666 (1970); Fair Labor
Standards Act Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(e) (Supp. 1976) (expands
OSHA into child labor area); 39 U.S.C. H9 5206, 5603-04 (1970) (Post Office); Natural
Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. H§ 1671, 1675, 1678-79 (1970). See Irey I 1204
n.10; Atlas Roofing 1009, n.43. Only two of these statutes have been tested in the
Supreme Court; both were upheld. Lloyd Sabaudo S.A. v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932)
(INS); Elting v. N. German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324 (1932); Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (INS); Allman v. United States, 131 U.S. 31,
35 (1889) (Post Office); Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 236 F. 433, 433-34
(8th Cir. 1916) (Post Office).
Several of the states also have statutory schemes allowing administrative imposition
of fines subject to only limited judicial review. E.g., Illinois Environmental Protection
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, H9 1041, 1042 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); N.Y. INs.
LAW § 95 (McKinney Supp. 1974); see Old Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Thacher, 12
N.Y.2d 48, 186 N.E.2d 554, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962).
In general, administrative resolution of issues of fact must be sustained if supported
by substantial evidence. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, for example, provides
that the OSHRC's findings, "if supported by substantial evidence on the record consid-
ered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970). Discussions of the
application of the substantial evidence rule can be found in L. JAFFE at 600 and K. DAvis
§ 29.02, 29.03.
6. Recommendation 72-6: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction in 2 RECOMMEN-
DATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADmwIsTRATIvz CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 66
(1972).
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The Third,7 Fifth," and Eighth9 Circuits have recently considered
these issues in a series of cases which challenge the authority of the
Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission (OSHRC) to im-
pose civil money penalties under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA)."° Each case involved a similar factual situation: the
OSHRC issued a final order assessing a civil penalty on the basis of an
administrative finding that a violation had occurred. 1 Those against
whom the penalties had been assessed appealed, arguing that the
OSHRC procedure was unconstitutional on two alternative theories.' 2
7. Irey II; Bloomfield Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. OSHRC, 37 AD. L. 2D 174
(3d Cir. 1975) (follows Irey I and Irey 11).
8. Atlas Roofing.
9. Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1974); American Smelting
& Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974).
10. See generally OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970).
11. In Atlas Roofing, the case before the Fifth Circuit, the OSHRC had affirmed a
$600 penalty assessed by the Secretary of Labor for a failure to cover a roof opening
adequately, a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(f) (S) (ii). The failure had resulted in
the death of an employee. The accident prompted a Department of Labor inspection.
Atlas Roofing 992.
In the Eighth Circuit cases, the OSHRC had assessed Beall Construction Co. a
$620 fine for one serious violation of suspension scaffolding regulations and four
nonserious violations pertaining to stairway illumination, compressed gas storage and fire
protection, Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 1974), and
American Smelting and Refining Co. had been fined $600 for violations of OSHA's
general duty clause (see note 22 infra), American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501
F.2d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 1974). In each case the employer appealed.
The scope of the Third Circuit's ruling in Irey I and Irey I is slightly different. The
Irey Co. was challenging the OSHRC's affirmation of a $5000 sanction which had been
imposed by an administrative law judge after his finding that a willful violation of
standards regarding the support of trenches, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b) (1973), had
occurred. A three judge panel of the appellate court affirmed the constitutionality of the
Act's enforcement procedure, lrey 1 1205 (2-1 decision), but reversed the administrative
judgment that the violation was willful, finding instead that the Commission's analysis of
that issue was based on an erroneous legal standard. Id. at 1207. The appellate court
remanded the willful violation question for further administrative consideration consist-
ent with its opinion while affirming a series of penalties assessed for non-willful
violations. Id. Although the court's opinion reveals little consideration of the constitu-
tional ramifications of OSHA's distinction between willful and non-willful violations, see
notes 166-169, 177-179 infra and accompanying text, the fact that the question of
whether a willful violation had occurred was remanded for administrative adjudication
suggests that the court's consideration of OSHA's enforcement procedures included ap-
proval of the OSHRC's handling of willful violations.
The Third Circuit reheard Irey's seventh amendment arguments en banc, and a
divided court sustained the panel decision to remand the factual issue of willful violations
to the OSHRC, apparently in the belief that such an administrative adjudication of the
issue would be constitutionally valid. See Irey 1I (6-4 decision).
The Bloomfield case concerned two serious and two nonserious violations of OSHA
regulations. The court felt compelled to follow its earlier holding in Irey II. Bloomfield
Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. OSHRC, 37 AD. L.2D 174, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1975).
12. The thrust of these challenges to OSHA concerned the unavailability of trial by
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First, the nominally civil penalties were so criminal in nature that a jury
trial was required in accordance with article I of the Constitution 3
and the sixth amendment.'14 Second, if criminal procedures were in-
appropriate, the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil
cases 5 was applicable. All three circuits rejected the sixth amendment
argument, holding that Congress had wide discretion to design methods
for enforcing its legislative policies.' 6  The seventh amendment argu-
ment was also rejected on the ground that Congress had the power to
devise an administrative scheme for enforcing civil duties which preclud-
ed recourse to the judicial system. 17 The importance of these decisions
is heightened by recent suggestions that OSHA's enforcement policies be
used as a model for other regulatory programs.' 8
This Comment will examine the extent to which the sixth and
seventh amendments limit the use of administrative forums as fact-
finders in proceedings to impose money penalties. After a brief review
of OSHA's penalty provisions, an examination will be made of tradition-
ally employed precedents, principles relied on in analogous areas of the
law, and the functions of civil and criminal juries. The purpose of this
examination will be to develop general principles for application of the
sixth and seventh amendments to legislative schemes providing for
administrative adjudication and imposition of money sanctions. These
principles will then be used to evaluate OSHA's penalty provisions.
jury at any point in the penalty imposition procedure. Traditionally, jury determination
of issues of fact is precluded under such statutory schemes because administrative
proceedings are incompatible with criminal procedure, see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 402 (1938), and are beyond the scope of the seventh amendment which is
restricted to those suits once triable at common law, U.S. CONSr. amend. VII. The
correctness of this traditional approach is the subject of this Comment.
In OSHA, review of the OSHRC's findings is under the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral appellate courts, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970), which do not conduct jury trials.
Moreover, review is specifically limited by the substantial evidence rule. Id. See
note 5 supra. For an outline of OSHA, see notes 19-39 infra and accompanying text.
13. 'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
.... " U.S. CONsr. art. m, § 2, cl. 3.
14. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. . . ." U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
15. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CONSr. amend. VII.
16. See Atlas Roofing 1009-12; Irey 1 1205; Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d
1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1974).
17. See Atlas Roofing 1011; Irey 1I 1218; Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d
1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1974).
18. See H. GoLDscHMm 901, 930-31, 939; Atlas Roofing 994.
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OSHA PENALTY PROVISIONS
OSHA was enacted in an effort to reduce the spiraling number of
job-related injuries and illnesses that threaten the lives of America's
workers. 19 In order to achieve this purpose, the Act provides for a
comprehensive scheme of administrative regulation. Inspectors em-
ployed by the Department of Labor are authorized to visit work facili-
ties20 and to issue citations2 for violations of the Act.22 When viola-
tions are discovered, the Secretary of Labor may recommend four
courses of action: (1) if the violation is non-serious, 23 a penalty of up to
$1000 may be proposed;24 (2) should the violation be serious but not
willful, the Act requires a penalty of up to $1000;25 (3) if a willful or
repeated violation has occurred, a penalty of up to $10,000 may be
recommended;2" (4) finally, if a willful violation has caused the death
19. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970); see S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
Meeds, A Legislative History of OSHA, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 327 (1974).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). The inspection procedures have been among the
most controversial provisions of the Act. Compare Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374
F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974), with Brennan v. Gibson's Prod. Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154
(E.D. Tex. 1976) (three-judge court); see Note, Brennan v. Buckeye Industries,
Inc.: The Constitutionality of an OSHA Warrantless Search, 1975 DUKE LJ. 406;
Comment, OSHA: Employer Beware, 10 HousToN L. REv. 426, 444-45 (1973). An
inspection may be made as a result of an employee request, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1970),
or at the discretion of the inspector who needs neither a warrant nor probable cause. See
id. § 657(a); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974); 29
C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1975). Contra, Brennan v. Gibson's Prod., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154
(E.D. Tex. 1976); Note, OSHA, supra, at 444-45. The inspections were intended
to carry an element of surprise so that employers would be vigilant in taking safety
precautions. Stender, Enforcing the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
The Federal Government as a Catalyst, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 641, 645-46 (1974).
Indeed, surprise was valued so highly that Congress enacted criminal sanctions
punishing anyone who gives advance notice of an inspection, 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1970). A written citation is to "describe with particularity
the nature of the violation, including a reference to the provision ... violated" and "fix
a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation." Id. § 658(a). The inspector may
also find that a violation exists but that it has no direct relationship to health or safety
and issue a notice of a de minimis violation in lieu of a citation. Such violations carry
no penalty. Id.
22. Citations may be issued for specific violations of standards promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor, see id. §§ 654(a)(2), 654(b), 655, or for violations of the Act's
broad general duty clause which requires an employer to "furnish to each of his em-
ployees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
." Id. § 654(a)(1).
23. The Act defines a serious violation as one causing "a substantial probability that
death or a serious physical harm could result... unless the employer did not, and could
not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation." Id.
§ 666(j).
24. Id. § 666(c).
25. Id. § 666(b). The statutory definition of "serious" is set forth in note 23 supra.
26. Id. § 666(a).
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of an employee, a criminal prosecution may follow, with a conviction
resulting in up to six months in prison and a $10,000 fine.2 7 A citation
must include a fixed period for abatement of the violation,28 and failure
to comply will subject the employer to a civil penalty of up to $1000 for
each day the violation continues after the abatement period has ended.29
All of OSHA's civil penalties are to be paid to the United States
Treasury. 0
Use of OSHA's criminal sanctions requires a conviction in an
article 
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the Commission,17 he may seek review of OSHRC's final order in the
appropriate circuit court of appeals." Review of administrative find-
ings of fact is limited; the Commission's findings "shall be conclusive"
"if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole.
3 9
SIXTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is guaranteed in the body
of the Constitution 0 and reasserted by the Bill of Rights. 41 According
to the Supreme Court, these provisions "reflect a profound judgment
about the way law should be enforced and justice should be adminis-
tered" so that government controls are prevented from becoming arbi-
trary and oppressive.42 The right to trial by jury guaranteed to criminal
defendants is one aspect of a judicial system that was carefully designed
to make certain that governmental power could not go unchecked.4 3 In
order to achieve this purpose, the courts must be diligent in examining
any delegation of adjudicative power to administrative agencies which
may deprive individuals of the procedural protections that are guaran-
teed by the Constitution.44
The ultimate question in determining the applicability of the sixth
amendment is whether the proceeding is "penal in nature.""" Although
it is frequently asserted that the distinction between civil and criminal
37. If the employer does not contest the proposed citation and/or penalty, the
OSHRC's order is nonreviewable. Id. § 659(a).
38. Id. § 660(a). The appeal must be brought within 60 days. Id. The Secretary
of Labor is also empowered to seek review of some Commission orders. Id. § 660(b).
39. Id. § 660(a).
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3, quoted at note 13 supra.
41. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, quoted at note 14 supra.
42. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
43. Id. at 156.
44. The constitutional provisions for the right to a jury in a criminal trial are also
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 158-59. This magnifies the importance of a careful analysis of the limits on
legislative discretion in prescribing civil penalties since the same limits which apply to
the federal government would presumably be applied to the states. Many of the states
presently have agencies with adjudicative powers subject to only limited review. E.g.,
Environmental Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1041, 1042 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1975); Fair Employment Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 860 (Smith-Hurd
1966); N.Y. INs. LAW § 5 (McKinney Supp. 1974); see Old Republic Life Ins. Co. v.
Thacher, 12 N.Y.2d 48, 186 N.E.2d 554, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962).
45. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1963); Lipke v.
Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) (alleged tax held to be a money penalty); O'Sullivan
v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914) (civil and criminal money sanctions for personal
assault).
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sanctions is merely one of statutory construction, 46 such an approach is
not helpful in delineating Congress' power to delegate adjudicative
authority to administrative bodies.47  Even a clear legislative classifica-
tion of a statute cannot so alter its fundamental nature as to enable it to
impinge on constitutional protections,48  and this proposition is no
less valid where only a pecuniary penalty is at stake. 9 Surely no
legislative label would enable Congress to authorize administrative im-
position of a $10,000 civil penalty for robbing a federal bank." Con-
gress may not circumvent the protections guaranteed criminal defend-
ants by simply prescribing civil procedures for adjudicating alleged
violations of the lawY1 Such legislation would represent exactly the
kind of arbitrary government conduct the sixth amendment was de-
signed to prevent.
46. See, e.g., United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974).
Such assertions often rely on language in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399
(1938). For a criticism of Williams' sixth amendment analysis, see Note, Tile Nature of
Judicial Involvement in Civil Penalty Proceedings to Execute FTC Cease and Desist
Orders, 1975 DUKE L.J. 501, 523-25.
47. This has already been recognized by the Fifth Circuit:
The Government naturally stresses the long accepted maxim that Congress
may use either criminal or civil measures to control similar conduct. But al-
though Congress has enormous flexibility in the selection of enforcement mea-
sures, the existence of both civil and criminal alternatives does not alone suf-
fice to validate the statute. Similarly, the absence of any mention of punish-
ment in the legislative history does not immunize the statute from further re-
view. Atlas Roofing 1000.
See Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 CORNELL L. Rnv. 478, 494 (1974); Comment, The Imposition of Administra-
tive Penalties and the Right to Trial by Jury-An Unheralded Expansion of Criminal
Law, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CraM. 345, 352 (1974); Note, supra note 46, at 523-25.
48. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); United States v.
J.B. Williams, 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974); Ashley v. Three Justices of Superior
Court, 228 Mass. 63, 77, 116 N.E. 961, 966 (1917), appeal dismissed per curiam for
want of jurisdiction sub nom. Ashley v. Wait, 250 U.S. 652 (1919); see Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958).
49. See United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La.
1974); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Charney, supra
note 47, at 482. But see United States v. J.B. Williams, 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir.
1974); H. GOLDSCHMm 915; Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of
Penalties, 1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 265, 273-74 n.21.
50. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958); United States v. LeBeouf Bros.
Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 563-64 (E.D. La. 1974) (hypothetical national drug
abuse program).
51. This is not an unfair characterization. See Charney, supra note 47, at 480. One
of the inter-house conferees who contributed to the compromises which led to the final
OSHA legislation, Senator Dominick, defended the use of civil penalties during floor
debate, explaining:
... we have a civil not a criminal penalty for a willful or repeated violation.
That has been treated with some care. We did it this way because I think
most of us know how difficult it is to get an enforceable criminal penalty in
these types of cases. Over and over again, the burden of proof under a crim-
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The Petty Crime Exception
Application of the sixth amendment is subject to one important
caveat. Even when a particular proceeding is penal, trial by jury is not
required if the crime at issue is "petty. '52 Thus, the petty crime
exception may allow administrative law judges to impose monetary
sanctions for criminal offenses.5 While the Supreme Court's position
on the classification of money fines as petty or non-petty is still un-
clear,64 a brief consideration of the two criteria normally considered in
inal-type allegation is so strong that you simply cannot get there, so you might
as well have a civil penalty instead of the criminal penalty and get the em-
ployer by the pocketbook if you cannot get him anywhere else. 116 CoNo.
RFc. 37,338 (1970).
A similar rationale was the basis for the more recent amendments to the Intercoastal
Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 815, 817, 822, 831, 844 (Supp. III, 1973), amending 46
U.S.C. §§ 814, 815, 817, 822, 831, 844 (1970), which converted provisions for criminal
penalties to civil penalties. See S. REP. No. 1014, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972).
52. This exception is an historic one that has been generally accepted as implicit in
the concept of the right to jury which the constitutional conventions embodied in
article III and the sixth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62
(1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (plurality opinion); Frank-
furter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury, 39 HIAv. L. R-v. 917 (1926); see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29-30
(1972). But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peerst , 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 245
(1959). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 413-14 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black, J., concurring);
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissent-
ing). As a result, the sixth amendment has been construed to guarantee a defendant's
right to counsel, his right to a speedy and public trial, a right to be informed of the ac-
cusation against him, a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a right to ob-
tain compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in all criminal trials. The right to trial by
jury, however, applies only where the crime is not petty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (established right to counsel in trial of petty offender).
53. See Comment, supra note 47, at 358. The importance of this point must not be
underestimated. Although this issue appears to have been ignored by all of the courts
which have examined the procedural constitutionality of OSHA's enforcement mecha-
nism, the petty crime exception has the potential to resolve many of the sixth amend-
ment challenges aimed at the unavailability of criminal juries in civil penalty cases. By
holding the OSHA penalties petty, the courts can sidestep the weightier sixth amendment
issue of whether or not the particular sanction is penal in nature. A finding that all
pecuniary penalties, or at least relatively small money fines (maximum fines of $500 or
$1000, for example), are petty could obviate any question of the right to a criminal jury
(in Irey I, for instance). Where trial by jury is not required and other elements of due
process are available, there is no obvious impediment to conducting a criminal proceed-
ing outside the state or federal courts. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) (right to trial by jury not required in juvenile hearings); Doub & Kestenbaum,
Federal Magistrates for the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107
U. PA. L. REv. 443 (1959).
54. See Charney, supra note 47, at 501-04; see, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454
(1975) (discussing application of petty crime exception to a money fine for civil
contempt); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137, at 11-17 (D.C. Cir. Mar.
3, 1976).
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making this determination-"the seriousness with which society regards
the offense" and "the severity of the maximum authorized penalty"--
indicates that not all money fines are necessarily petty.55
With respect to the severity of the maximum authorized penalty,
decisions have generally begun with the statutory definition of a petty
offense"s as "[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of more than six months, or a fine of not
more than $500, or both. . .. 517 Just as the Supreme Court has
construed this definition so as to find a petty offense when no more than
six months imprisonment is at issue,58 the statutory language suggests
that a petty offense will exist where the potential fine does not exceed
$500."5 While recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that there is
nothing thaumaturgic about the $500 figure and that classification of
monetary fines will vary according to their effect on a given defendant, 60
it seems clear that not all money fines will necessarily be classified as
petty.
This view is supported by the increasingly serious offenses now
being punished by monetary sanctions. 61 Pettiness has never been a
55. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Douglass v. First Nat'!
Realty Corp., No. 73-1137, at 11-14 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976). See also District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); cf. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 52,
at 980-81.
56. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137, at 14-15
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970). A misdemeanor is defined as any offense that is not
a felony, id. § 1(2), and a felony is any offense made "punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," id. § 1(1).
58. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) ("[N]o offense can be deemed
petty for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six
months is authorized"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968); Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966).
59. See Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137, at 17 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3,
1976); United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that
where a corporation was vulnerable to a fine of over $500, the fine was not petty). There
is a historical argument that the sixth amendment was never intended to cover sanctions
where only property, not personal liberty, is at stake, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 45 n.2 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Kaye, supra note 52, at 274-77; see H.
GOLDSCHMID 915. But see Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975). Such a view seems
unreasonable in view of the increasingly large money penalties imposed and the increas-
ingly serious offenses which they are used to sanction.
60. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., No. 73-1137, at 15-17 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976).
61. Compare Doub & Kestenbaum, supra note 53, at 445-46 (catalogue of present
federal petty offenses), with OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970) (civil penalty for willful
violation of regulations designed to prevent serious harm to an employee). See also
District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930) (reckless driving prosecution held
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rigidly fixed concept.62 Its dimensions vary from generation to genera-
tion so that "a penalty once thought to be mild may come to be regarded
as so harsh as to call for the jury" even where it was not available in
similar cases when the Constitution was adopted. 63 Certainly, as the
prisons become more crowded and the opposition to imprisonment as
unnecessary and ineffective continues to mount, Congress and the courts
will rely more and more heavily on monetary sanctions to punish serious
offenses. Such punishments should not be classified as petty unless they
actually fit the traditional conception of a petty crime as an act "which
[does] not offend too deeply the moral purposes of the community, and
[is] stigmatized by punishment relatively light."64  Only by carefully
applying these factors on a case-by-case basis can the sixth amendment
right to trial by jury remain an effective check against unjust govern-
ment regulation.
Application of these general principles suggests that a further
inquiry into the primary nature of OSHA's penalty provisions is in
order. The relatively harsh penalty for willful violations65 and the grave
nature of the conduct which constitutes a serious offense66 make it
doubtful that these classes of violations could properly be characterized
as petty. While the penalty for non-serious violations67 might be classi-
fied as petty, enabling a sanction to be imposed summarily, it is still
necessary to consider whether or not that sanction is penal, for if it is
not, its pettiness is irrelevant and the procedure for imposition must still
surmount a seventh amendment challenge.0 8
Applying the Sixth Amendment: When is a Sanction Penal?
Determination of whether a given proceeding is in fact penal in
nature has historically hinged upon a distinction between a wrong done
to an individual and a wrong done to the public. 69 This contrast
malum in se and therefore required right to trial by jury despite defendant's vulner-
ability to maximum penalty of only $100 or 30 days in jail).
62. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 52, at 980.
63. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
64. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 52, at 980-81; cf. ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL By JURY 20-21
(Approved Draft 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5), Comment (Proposed Draft
1962).
65. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970) ($10,000 maximum penalty for each
willful violation).
66. See id. §§ 666(a)-(b). For the definition of a serious violation see note 23
supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
68. See notes 183-267 infra and accompanying text.
69. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) was one of the earliest cases to make
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between the criminal and civil law is epitomized by the classification of
contempt proceedings. While either form of contempt may result in
incarceration, the object of the different proceedings is quite distinct:
A proceeding for civil contempt has as its object remedial punishment
by way of a coercive imprisonment, or a compensatory fine, payable
to the complainant. A proceeding for criminal contempt seeks pun-
ishment to vindicate the authority of the court. 70
The purpose of civil contempt and its sanctions is to benefit the individ-
ual rather than the state by compelling the wrongdoer to comply with
the law as established by the court.7 ' Criminal contempt is designed to
this distinction. There the Court relied upon a classification developed by Blackstone
which distinguished between private wrongs involving the infringement of rights belong-
ing to the individual and public wrongs which involve a violation of public rights and
duties which benefit the community as a whole. Id. at 668-69, citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *2. Thus, according to the early cases, whether an action was penal in
nature depended on "whether the wrong to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a
wrong to the individual." Id. at 668. This dichotomy between public and private
wrongs was the forerunner of the modem distinction between the criminal law as penal
and the civil law as remedial or compensatory. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943).
70. United States v. Schine, 125 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D.N.Y. 1954) (citations
omitted); see Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-71 (1966); Douglass v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 73-1137, at 6-7 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1976). See also R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 532,33 (2d ed. 1969).
71. A similar distinction is found in the law of nuisance. A public nuisance is an
"act or omission 'which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the
exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.'" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAw oF TORTS § 88 at 583 (4th ed. 1971). It is a public wrong which is generally
punished as a criminal offense. See id. A private nuisance on the other hand is a
private wrong. The individual to whom the action accrues has been injured by the
wrongful conduct in a way which differentiates him from other members of the
community. His remedy lies in the civil law. See id. § 86 at 572-73, § 89. The
distinction closely follows the classification employed in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657 (1892), discussed at note 69 supra and accompanying text.
One possible exception to the general applicability of the public/private distinction
as a method of determining whether a statute is penal or civil in nature is found in recent
environmental legislation protecting wildlife. Wild animals have traditionally belonged
to all the citizens of a country in their collective capacify. As the representative of this
collective, the government has the authority to exercise control over wild animals as a
trust for the benefit of its citizens. "Implicit in this power was the right to regulate or
absolutely prohibit the taking of or traffic in, animals ferae naturae, if such action was
deemed necessary for the protection or preservation of the public good." Flemming v.
'United States, 352 F.2d 533, 536 (Ct. Cl. 1965). This position is most completely
detailed in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), and has since been reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399-403 (1948). This
being the case, the state or federal government may be considered to own the endan-
gered species and other wild animals which it chooses to protect, in which case a
civil action may be appropriate to protect a private right even though it is exercised
for the public good. Such an argument might justify the use of civil fines in such
legislation as the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a) (Supp. III,
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protect the public interest by deterring particular conduct and punishing
its occurrence. 72 The distinction provides the basis for determining the
constitutional protections that must be afforded an individual charged
with contempt. 73
The modem approach for determining whether a particular penalty
brings the sixth amendment into play was formalized by the Supreme
Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.74 At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of provisions of the Nationality Act which provided for
involuntary expatriation, without hearing, of persons leaving the United
States to avoid a wartime draft. 75 In holding that the Act violated the
sixth amendment, 76 the Court announced a two-step test to aid in the
resolution of future sixth amendment questions. 77 First, whenever
possible, legislative purpose must be construed from "objective manifes-
tations" contained in the legislative history of the provision;18 however,
if such an inquiry does not produce "conclusive evidence of the legisla-
tive aim," an objective appraisal of the statute itself must be made.79
1973); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540a (1974); Bald Eagle Protection
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
Use of such an exception would be severely limited. While a similar argument
might be made in support of civil penalties for pollution control violators, precedent does
not support such an argument. When the wrong is an undifferentiable injury to the
interests (as opposed to the property) of the general public, the appropriate action has
generally been one for public nuisance, exposing the individual responsible to criminal
liability.
72. Douglass v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp. No. 73-1137, at 6-7 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3,
1976); Lopiparo v. United States, 222 F.2d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 1955); Jeneau Spruce
Corp. v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 131 F. Supp. 866,
871 (D. Hawaii 1955). "Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a viola-
tion of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both."
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,
368-71 (1966). See also R. PEPRINS, supra note 70, at 533-34.
73. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-202 (1968) (established sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury in criminal contempt proceedings); Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364, 368-71 (1966).
74. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). A similar analysis had previously been used in Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960) (termination of deported aliens' old age benefits
held not to require a trial with all the incidents of the sixth amendment).
75. See Nationality Act of 1940 § 401(j), 58 Stat. 746 (1944), and its successor and
counterpart, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 349(a) (10), 66 Stat. 163, 267-
68 (1952).
76. 372 U.S. at 165.
77. Id. at 168-69.
78. Id. at 169; see United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla.
1972); Telephone News Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621, 630 (N.D.
I1. 1963) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 376 U.S. 782 (1964).
79. 372 U.S. at 169; see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); United
States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 563 (E.D. La. 1974); United
States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Telephone News Sys.,
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The analysis is designed to determine whether the legislative aim in
providing a sanction was to punish an individual for unlawful conduct
or to regulate the conduct in question. 80 Thus, in order for a civil
money penalty to pass the test of Mendoza-Martinez, it must have a
legitimate remedial purpose.8 That is, it must either compensate an
injured party for a loss or serve to abate a hazard which violates the law.
Compensatory Penalties
It has long been recognized that compensation of the govern-
ment for its injuries is a legitimate function of the civil law.2
Reimbursement for loss is the normal civil remedy for a private injury. 3
While the situation may seem somewhat different when the injured
party is the government and has legislated its compensation in advance,
Congress' authority to fix appropriate fines for private injuries is firmly
established, 4 and that power exists whether the wrong committed is
against the government or against a private individual. 8 Despite their
relative severity, the Court has consistently refused to invalidate such
sanctions unless the measure of recovery fixed by Congress is unreason-
ably excessive.8 6 Thus, the power to tax puts the government and the
Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (three-judge court), aff'd
per curiam, 376 U.S. 782 (1964).
80. United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 562 (E.D. La.
1974); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Telephone
News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621, 630 (N.D. Ill. 1963)
(three-judge court), af'd per curiam, 376 U.S. 782 (1964); see Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960).
81. See 372 U.S. at 169; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-16 (1960); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
82. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 241, 243-44 (1850); see United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S, 391, 399-401 (1938).
83. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135 (1973); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES 23 (1935).
84. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154-56 (1899) (copyright law setting mini-
mum recovery for infringement held not penal).
85. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-52 (1943) (statute
requiring payment of costs, $2000 and double damages as a civil penalty for fraudu-
lent government bidding). See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
148 (1956); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 241 (1850). The civil law
binds all to all, and damages that are difficult to assess may be defined by Congress as it
defines civil relationships. Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899).
Congress' power to set compensation for injury to the government is closely
analogous to the prerogative of private parties to bind themselves through liquidated
damage clauses designed to set reasonable damages for injuries which will be difficult to
evaluate in money terms; see id. at 151; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718;
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
86. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1938) (fine for $728,709.84 tax
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taxpayer in a debtor-creditor relationship,8 7 and a civil proceeding is the
appropriate vehicle for resolution of disputes over the debt.88 Similarly,
the compensation rationale justifies Congress' frequent use of civil mon-
ey penalties as a form of liquidated damages when government contrac-
tors do not perform in accordance with their agreements, 0 or govern-
ment licensees do not comply with restrictions on their licenses. 0
As long as the primary purpose of an action is the compensation of
a victim by his wrongdoer, it can be conducted under the rules of civil
procedure regardless of other punitive effects which may inhere in the
available remedy. 1 Holdings which approve an element of deterrence
deficiency was an additional $364,354.92; upheld by the Court despite the fact that it did
far more than indemnify the Government for its loss). The more recent cases rely on a
standard of "unreasonable excessiveness" which is consistent with Helvering. E.g., One
Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972)
(forfeiture of stones and ring was not an excessive penalty for failure to declare them
when they were brought into the country); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S.
148, 154 (1956) ($2000 plus double damages for fraudulent purchase of Government
surplus was not excessive enough to make the penalty penal).
87. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
88. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943). See
generally D. DOBBS, supra note 83, at 232-35; J. MOORE 38.11[5].
89. E.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956). The
contractual rationale justifies the use of civil sanctions by two of the administrative
agencies which are presently authorized to impose penalties subject to only limited
judicial review. The Post Office is presently authorized to penalize its carriers for
failure or refusal to transport the mail without invoking the power of the courts. See 39
U.S.C. §§ 5206, 5603, 5604 (1970). The validity of these provisions is well settled by
the courts. Allman v. United States, 131 U.S. 31, 35 (1889); Great Northern Ry. v.
United States, 236 F. 433, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1916). These statutory provisions are
analogous to liquidated damages and are incidents of the relationship between the
government and another contracting party. See note 85 supra.
A more recent illustration of this rationale is found in the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board's (FHLBB) authority to impose penalties on banks involved in the home loan
bank program or insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. 12 U.S.C. §
1425a(d) (1970) (penalty for a deficiency under the Act's liquidity requirements). In
return for loans and/or insurance the banks agree to comply with the regulation
authorized by the Act. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1424, 1430 (1970) with 12 U.S.C. §
1425a(d) (1970). "The counsel of the FHLBB reported that 'there has never been a
court appeal' but that 'review would be limited to considering whether the Board had
acted arbitrarily or capriciously.'" H. GOLDSCHMID 952 n.5.
90. E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970) (penalties for violations by broadcast licen-
sees). The license or permit subjects its holders to certain responsibilities inherent in
the license. See id.
Professor Jaffe has commented on the utility of such combinations of licensing and
fining powers: 'To be sure, when the revocation power is conferred on an agency, it
may be advisable to confer a fining power as well. This reduces the pressure on the
agency to use the revocation power in marginal cases." L JAFFE 114.
91. Cf. Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 MICH. L. REv. 393, 409-
10 (1971).
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in primarily compensatory penalties are consistent with the normal
mechanisms of the civil law.92 Though normally associated with the
criminal sanction, deterrence is certainly not unknown to the civil law's
arsenal of remedies. Not only does compensation itself typically contain
a punitive aspect, 93 but both exemplary and multiple damages have
been accepted as valid components of the civil law despite their essen-
tially punitive natures. 4 Where private recovery for particular conduct
is typically accompanied by punitive damages, there is no reason why
Congress should not take this fact into account when setting penalties
for similar wrongdoing perpetrated against the government.95 In gener-
92. The leading case in this area is Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)
where the Court rejected arguments that a statute assessing a 50% addition to fraudulent
tax deficiencies, Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 293(b), 45 Stat. 791, was penal in
nature. According to the Court, the penalty was a remedial sanction designed "primari-
ly as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for
the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud." 303
U.S. at 401. This holding clearly approves a deterrent element-the penalty is supposed
to protect the revenue by providing a fear of loss that will deter tax fraud.
This interpretation of Mitchell as approving some deterrent effects in an essentially
remedial statute is supported by the authority cited in support of the holding. Id. at
401 n.4. Both Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263, 274 (1853), and Passavant v.
United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221 (1893), approve the imposition of additional duties for
undervaluation of imports in an effort to discourage attempts to "escape the legal rates of
duty."
The size of the penalty provided in Mitchell also supports this position. See note
86 supra. It has been pointed out that such a large penalty is unrelated to investigative
expenses and losses. Gellhorn, supra note 49, at 273-74 n.21; H. GOLDSCHMD 914-15.
That interpretation is borne out by comparing the 50% penalty still imposed for willful
violations, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6653(b), with the penalty now allowed for
negligent tax evasion. Id. § 6653 (a).
93. Requiring any wrongdoer to compensate his victim will, in a sense, punish the
wrongdoer. It is the nature of the action as a whole that determines whether it is
remedial or penal. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 155-58 (1899).
94. Although it is clear that their purpose is to punish wrongdoers and to deter
wrongful conduct, punitive damages are an established element of the law of torts. Scott
v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86-90 (1897); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371
(1851). See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 3.9; W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 2.
Multiple damages have also been accepted despite their severity. Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (antitrust violations); United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1943) (penalty for'collusive bidding
for government contracts). Such measures of damages have been justified as a necessary
incentive for private parties to serve as "private attorneys general," 405 U.S. at 262, and
it has been stressed that they are proportionally related to the amount of actual injury.
317 U.S. at 550.
Attorneys' fees are also awarded with certain civil fines to encourage the injured
parties to bring their action despite the high costs of litigation. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). For cases approving the award of attor-
neys' fees, see United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1943); Atchi-
son, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899); Annot., 16 A.L.R. FED. 643
(1973).
95. This justifies, for example, the high penalties the Court has approved for willful
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al, criminal procedure will be required only when a penalty becomes so
punitive that its primary purpose can no longer be characterized as
compensatory 6
Regulatory Sanctions
Sanctions which fulfill a legitimate regulatory function may also be
sustained against constitutional objections even where highly punitive
effects are apparent. In Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co.,9 7 a three-judge district court upheld a statute which
required termination of telephone service upon the request of any law
enforcement agency which had determined that the phones were being
used to communicate illegal gambling information 5  Despite its ac-
knowledgement that termination of phone service was tantamount to
sentencing a business to death,99 the district court rejected a sixth
amendment challenge on the basis of conclusive evidence that the
sanction was designed not to punish but to suppress the evil that was the
object of the regulatory scheme.100 In the court's view, any loss to the
plaintiff was merely "incidental to the suppression of the business of
wagering that was the intent of the statute."' 01
The rationale of Telephone News System suggests that, in order for
the civil law to retain its essentially nonpunitive character, its use as a
tax evasion, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), collusion with intent to
defraud the Government of the United States, e.g. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537 (1943), and fraudulent undervaluation of imports, e.g. Passavant v. United
States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893). Successful actions for fraud typically include exemplary
damages. See W. PROSSER, supra note 70, § 110 at 736.
96. See, e.g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931); Helwig v. United
States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Fla.
1972).
97. 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. II.. 1963) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 376
U.S. 782 (1964).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (1970).
99. 220 F. Supp. at 641-43 (Will, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 626-27, 631. According to the court:
The first matter to be consulted, legislative history, in no way suggests that
Congress meant for discontinuation of telephone service to be a penalty for vi-
olation of a criminal law. To the contrary, we have already shown that the
congressional aim in enacting this provision was to curtail professional gambl-
ing activities-particularly bookmaking-by depriving those engaged in such
activities of the rapid wire communications facilities necessary to their opera-
tion. Id. at 630.
101. Id. at 631. Other courts have been unable to find such regulatory purposes in
money penalties. United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 563-65
(E.D. La. 1974) ("The Court cannot find any legitimate governmental purpose served
by paragraph 5 [Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (5)] save to
reprimand the wrongdoer, by providing a pecuniary punishment, and, to deter others
from illicitly discharging oil into the waterways"); United States v. Futura, Inc.,
339 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (N.D. Fla. 1972) (Economic Stabilization Act of 1970).
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vehicle for imposing noncompensatory fines should be limited to sanc-
tions that are in fact remedial-sanctions that are aimed at securing
compliance rather than punishing offenders. This distinction has long
been recognized. In 1943, Professor Edmund Schwenk emphasized
that "the chief interest of ...administrative law is directed toward
compliance with administrative duties . . . rather than punishment for
their violation .... 102 For Schwenk, this purpose suggested that
administrative sanctions were appropriate only if they would lead to
performance of administratively mandated duties.1 °3 Money sanctions,
then, may be used when other means of indirect compulsion are unavail-
able."04
The better reasoned cases have recognized this distinction and have
stressed that the label which Congress attaches to a sanction is of little
weight for purposes of the Mendoza-Martinez test. Rather than simply
noting that the penalty at issue carries a civil label as some courts have
done,10 5 cases following the guidelines of Mendoza-Martinez have care-
fully investigated the purpose underlying the sanction to determine
whether its designation as civil is appropriate under the Constitution. °6
102. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by Adminis-
trative Agencies, 42 Micu. L. REv. 51, 86 (1943).
103. Id.
104. Id. More recently, a similar approach has been advocated by Professor Jona-
than Charney, who suggests that an uncompensated loss is not a criminal sanction if it is*
"a reasonable, necessary, and incidental effect of government action." Charney, supra
note 47, at 511; see id. at 510-12, 514-16. Charney, however, refuses to accept that
money penalties can ever serve a remedial function. Id. n.162. The position taken in
this Comment falls in between the opposing stances taken by Professors Charney and
Goldschmid. Goldschmid believes that civil money penalties are appropriate if they
"may be expected to have a prophylactic or remedial effect." H. GOLDSCHmID 914.
Charney, on the other hand, contends that a money penalty can never have either. This
Comment follows the line of reasoning suggested by Schwenk, supra note 102. The only
prophylactic effect a money sanction could have is through pure deterrence, marking it
as penal in nature. It can, however, serve as a means of indirect compulsion where no
other means of obtaining compliance is possible, and may in this sense have a legitimate
remedial effect. Id.
105. See, e.g., Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir., 1974);
American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 515 (8th Cir. 1974)
("Congress here clearly intended to create a civil sanction"); United States v. J.B.
Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974).
106. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 562
(E.D. La. 1974); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972);
Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621, 629-32 (N.D.
Il1. 1963) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 376 U.S. 782 (1964).
A federal district court strongly emphasized the proper focus of the Mendoza-
Martinez inquiry in United States v, LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 563
(E.D. La. 1974):
At first blush, the paragraph here in question appears to be nonpenal, es-
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These courts have been careful to focus on the sanction involved and
have not been deterred by a legislative history which has not provided
conclusive evidence of the aim of the statute. 117
The proper analysis of legislative purpose is exemplified by Chief
Justice Warren's pre-Mendoza opinion in Trop v. Dulles.08 Trop was
contesting a statute which provided for expatriation upon courtmartial
conviction of desertion in time of war. The Court had to address the
issue of whether the sanction was penal in nature to determine whether
the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment
was applicable. The government contended that the statute, rather than
being penal, was a regulatory provision authorized by the war power.0 9
The Court rejected this contention. Allowing that regulation of desert-
ers was among Congress' powers, the Court held that "a statute pre-
scribing the consequence that will befall one who fails to abide by these
regulatory provisions is a penal law."" 0 As a concurring Justice ex-
plained:
It is difficult, indeed, to see how expatriation of the deserter helps
wage war except as it performs that function when imposed as pun-
ishment. It is obvious that expatriation cannot in any wiso avoid
the harm apprehended by Congress. After the act of desertion, only
punishment can follow, for the harm has been done.""'
While Mendoza-Martinez clearly establishes the appropriate in-
quiry for determining whether a particular sanction is of such a punitive
nature as to require the procedural protections of the criminal law, the
courts have shown some reluctance to apply its analysis to statutory
pecially in view of the purported "civil penalty" that is assessed for the pro-
scribed activity. But to be guided in the interpretive process by such superfi-
cial implements as word classification or legal jargon truly would be an analyt-
ical pitfall in allowing form to replace substance. Chief Justice Warren, speak-
ing for the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94. . . (1958) recognized
the patent inadequacy of such an approach when he remarked: "How simple
would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if spe-
cific problems could be solved by inspection of labels pasted on them!" The
real nature and intended objective of a statute must be unearthed to avoid
Swiftonian-like deceit. [footnotes omitted].
107. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.
La. 1974); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Fla. 1972); cf. United
States v. Krapf, 180 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1961).
Though its reasoning led it to a conclusion different from that of this Comment, the
Fifth Circuit was similarly diligent in its analysis of OSHA. See Atlas Roofing 999-
1012. Compare id. with Irey I 1286-87 and American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC,
501 F.2d 504, 515 (8th Cir. 1974).
108. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
109. Id. at 97.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 109-10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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money penalties.112  In general, the courts have felt constrained" 3 by
an early line of cases" 14 which appeared to grant Congress broad
discretion to employ civil fines to enforce its legislative policies." 5 It
seems, however, that such precedents should be controlling only in areas
such as revenue raising and foreign relations where the Court has
traditionally deferred to the competence of its coequal branches of
government." 86
112. See, e.g., lrey 1 1203-06; United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421(2d Cir. 1974). Only recently have the courts begun to scrutinize civil fines. See, e.g.,
United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974) (applying
sixth amendment to a "civil" money sanction); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F.
Supp. 162 (N.D. Fla. 1972) (applying criminal protections to a federal sanction intended
to be civil); Tulsa Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. McMichael Concrete Co., 495 P.2d 1279(Okla. 1972). This more recent view, rigorously applying the Mendoza-Martinez test,
has been widely accepted by the commentators. See, e.g., McClintock & Bohrnsen,
Constitutional Challenges, 10 GONZAGA L. Rv. 361, 385-88 (1974); Comment, supra
note 20, at 230-31; Comment, supra note 47, at 355-57.
113. In examining OSHA, the Third Circuit openly questioned the wisdom of the
administrative imposition scheme before it, but felt that its holding was compelled by the
present state of the law. See Irey I 1205 n.1 1; Irey II 1207, 1219. Similarly, the Second
Circuit felt compelled to reject a request for a sixth amendment jury in FTC enforcement
proceedings since "[i]n the face of a long line of contrary authority, appellants [had]
not directed [the court's] attention to any civil penalty provision that had been held
sufficiently criminal in nature to invoke the protections of the Sixth Amendment."
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974). This aspect of
the decision has been criticized, see Note, supra note 46, at 523-25, and at least one
recent decision has applied the sixth amendment to a case of this type, see United States
v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. La. 1974); cf. United States v.
Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
114. Elting v. N. German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324 (1932); Lloyd Sabaudo S.A. v. Elting,
287 U.S. 329 (1932); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
115. E.g., frey 1 1204; Atlas Roofing 1002; United States v. J.B. Williams, 498 F.2d
414 (2d Cir. 1974); see H. GOLDSCHMm 915-16; Comment, The Concept of Punitive
Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
32 U. Cm. L. REy. 290, 292-93 (1965).
116. Cf. Note, supra note 30, at 548-49. Issues relating to foreign relations have
traditionally been avoided by the Court; it is acutely aware of the lack of judicial
standards for approaching such problems and the importance of maintaining internal
unity on such matters. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962); cf. Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
307 (1829). Both tariff and immigration policies carry broad international implications.
As a result, the Court has been careful to preserve room for executive and legislative
discretion in designing tariff policies, see J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394 (1928) (approves statutory provisions for flexible tariffs); Bartlett v. Kane, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853) (congressional discretion in designing methods of enforcing
tariffs), and the States have been expressly denied the authority to lay duties on imports
or exports without the consent of Congress. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, c. 2; Board of
Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933).
Similarly, Congress' power to exclude aliens and regulate naturalization and
immigration, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, has been vigorously preserved, Fung Yue Ting
(Vol. 1976:723
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The Exclusive Power Doctrine
Analysis of the leading case of Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan"17 supports this interpretation. Stranahan concerned a chal-
lenge to the validity of legislation authorizing the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor to impose a $100 fine on a vessel's owner for each
immigrant brought into the United States with a "loathsome or conta-
gious disease" that could have been detected by a proper medical exam-
niation at the time of embarkation." 8 The Secretary (or his agent) was
empowered to impose the fixed penalty on the strength of his own ad-
ministrative findings of fact. Relying chiefly on cases which had sus-
tained the power of Congress to grant customs officials authority to
impose money penalties for undervaluation of imported goods," 9 the
Supreme Court approved this procedure while presenting a broad con-
ception of congressional power:
[I]t [is] within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to
matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obliga-
tions and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties,
giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties with-
out the necessity of involving the judicial power.120
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-
04 (1889), and a strong line of authority attests to the exclusivity of this particular
power. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-79 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 42 (1915); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 700-01 (1898); Chirac v.
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817). "[The states] can neither add to nor take
from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization, and
residence of aliens in the United States or the several states." Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). See notes 133-34 infra and accompany-
ing text.
Similar scope may also be found in the power to raise revenue where federal taxes
are preemptive in scope. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); cf. Note,
supra note 30, at 548. See generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESs, Tim CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 133-34 (1973).
117. 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
118. An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States, ch. 1012,
§ 9, 32 Stat. 1213, 1215-16 (1903), cited in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Strana-
han, 214 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1909). Similar statutes in this area are still enforced by
the Attorney General through the Immigration and Naturalization Service subject
to only limited judicial review. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221(d), 1227(a), 1229, 1253(c)-(f),
1281(d), 1284-87, 1321, 1322, 1333 (1970); see Elting v. N. German Lloyd, 287
U.S. 324, 328 (1932); H. GoLnscmvun 960.
119. See 214 U.S. at 338-39, citing Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893);
Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853).
120. 214 U.S. at 339; see Lloyd Sabaudo S.A. v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932).
The Court suggested that taxation and tariff were subject to this exclusive control. 214
U.S. at 334. Then, in upholding the legislation at issue, it explained:
As the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United
States embraces every conceivable aspect of that subject, it must follow that
if Congress has deemed necessary to impose particular restrictions on the com-
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On first reading, the broad language of Stranahan seems to disclose
no limit on Congress' authority to enact administrative procedures for
imposing civil money penalties. A closer reading, however, suggests
that the actual bounds set forth in the opinion are much narrower than
its broad language seems to imply. First, Stranahan is expressly limited
to matters "exclusively in the control of Congress."'' If this limitation
is to have any meaning, it must refer to those few powers, such as
taxation, tariffs, and regulation of immigration and naturalization,
which can be exercised only by the federal government.' 22 Even where
Congress has such exclusive control over an area, Stranahan directs the
courts to examine "the constitutional right of Congress to enact such
legislation."'1 23  Civil procedure is incompatible with the constitutional
rights guaranteed the criminal defendant,' 24 and Congress obviously
has no authority to legislate a procedure that is incompatible with
the Constitution. 2 5  Hence, if the courts examine a sanction and de-
termine that its primary purpose is punitive, the provision is invalid
unless appropriate protections are available.
This approach is evident in the several decisions in which the
Supreme Court has struck down a variety of purportedly civil sanctions
as penal in nature. Despite the suggestion in Stranahan that Congress
would have broad authority to enforce its tax and tariff policies through
the civil law,12 several such provisions have been found so penal in
ing in of aliens, and to sanction such prohibitions by penalties enforcible by
administrative authority; it follows that the constitutional right of Congress to
enact such legislation is the sole measure by which its validity is to be deter-
mined by the courts. Id. at 340.
121. 214 U.S. at 339.
122. See id.; cf. Note, supra note 30, at 548-49. Much of the confusion concerning
the scope of Stranahan is a result of the conflicting language contained in Lloyd Sabaudo
S.A. v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932), where the Supreme Court describes Congress'
control over the admission of aliens once as "exclusive," id. at 334, and once as
"plenary," id. at 335. As Professors Davis and Jaffe have each pointed out, if the
Court's suggestion that Congress may create civil money penalties is taken seriously,
congressional authority to permit administrative imposition of money penalties is bound-
less because of the plenary power to regulate commerce. K. DAvis § 2.13; L. JAFFE 111.
Surely, although regulation of federal banks is in the national interest and within the
power granted to Congress under the commerce clause, the Court would not allow
administrative imposition of fines upon thieves whom an administrative law judge has
found guilty of robbing federal banks. See cases cited at note 50 supra. Stranahan is
clearly concerned with "exclusive," 214 U.S. at 339, or "absolute" congressional authori-
ty, id. at 342, and Elting makes no pretense of expanding that precedent, see 287 U.S. at
334-35.
123. 214 U.S. at 340.
124. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938).
125. See id. at 402 n.6; Comment, supra note 115, at 303; cf. Wing Wong v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (striking down administrative sanction of incarceration).
126. 214 U.S. at 334. See note 120 supra.
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nature that constitutional protections normally reserved for the criminal-
ly accused were required.'2 7  Punitive tax measures have been held to
be outside the power to raise revenue, 128 and Congress' power to impose
civil money penalties has been limited to fines that are neither unreason-
able nor confiscatory.'29 More recently, the Court has used the primary
nature test in applying the sixth amendment to laws enacted under the
war power 3 0 and in extending the right to trial by jury to criminal
contempt proceedings. 3 ' Such results indicate that the precedential
value of early cases which espoused judicial deference to legislative labels
and historic traditions may be severely limited.1
3 2
Application of the Mendoza-Martinez Test: The OSHA Example
It is very doubtful whether reliance should be placed on the broad
language of Stranahan in matters other than those, like immigration and
tariffs, over which Congress has such complete control that the courts
have traditionally deferred to legislative judgments.3 3 The commerce
power under which OSHA was promulgated is peculiarly non-exclu-
127. United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) (double jeopardy and prohibi-
tion tax); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (constitutional hearing required to
impose tax that was penal in nature); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903)
(constitutional hearing required to impose additional duties when appraised value of
imported goods exceeds value declared at customs); see United States v. Constantine,
296 U.S. 287 (1935) (federal tax imposed for violation of state law was penal and, thus,
an unconstitutional intrusion on the state police power).
128. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); United States v. LaFranca,
282 U.S. 568 (1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
129. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12
(1903); see One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972); Lloyd Sabaudo S.A. v. Elting, 287 U.S. 324 (1932).
130. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958).
131. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Bloom reversed a long line of cases in
which the Supreme Court had held that criminal contempt proceedings were outside the
trial-by-jury provisions of the sixth amendment, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165 (1958). Bloom's dramatic reversal of established precedent was the result of a
reexamination of criminal contempt which led the Court to conclude "that serious
contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial
provisions of the Constitution .... "391 U.S. at 198. See generally R. PERKIns, supra
note 70, at 534.
132. See Comment, supra note 47, at 354, 356-57, 359-60; Comment, The Availabili-
ty of Criminal Jury Trials Under the Sixth Amendment, 32 U. Crm. L. Rav. 311, 323
(1965).
133. See notes 117-132 supra and accompanying text. See Comment, supra note 47,
at 355 n.76; Note, supra note 30, at 548-49. But see Irey I 1203; United States v. J.B.
Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Atlas Roofing 1011.
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sive.134  Indeed, OSHA itself contains specific provisions to encourage
state action designed to facilitate occupational safety.' 3 5  Hence,
OSHA's penalty provisions should not be sustained merely by reference
to Congress' broad discretion to design methods to enforce its legislative
policies.'3 0
Likewise, the legislative history of OSHA does not provide the
conclusive evidence required to end the sixth amendment inquiry. 3T
Committee hearings and reports suggest that there was substantial dis-
pute over the severity and intent of the Act's sanctions; 38 however, since
discussion of these provisions was apparently reserved for executive
session, 130 the purpose of the sanctions remains unclear. 40
134. "[Flederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive
of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons ....... Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); cf. Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 634 (1951) ("[T]here necessarily remains to the States, until
Congress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to their
territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce may be affected . . . . States are
thus enabled to deal with local exigencies and to exert in the absence of conflict with
federal legislation an essential protective power"); Kellyn v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9-
10 (1937).
135. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1970).
136. See Atlas Roofing 1000, 1011. Contra, Irey 1 1204-05. The analysis in Irey I
is criticized at note 141 infra.
137. Comment, supra note 20, at 440; Note, OSHA Penalties: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 10 IDAHO L. REv. 223, 233 (1974). See Atlas Roofing 1000; notes 138-
39 infra and accompanying text. But see Irey 1 1205; Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507
F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1974); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d
504, 515 (8th Cir. 1974). The last three cases cited contain superficial analyses of con-
gressional intent.
138. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87-89 (1970)
(testimony of Secretary of Labor Shultz and Solicitor Silberman); id. at 684 (testimony
of Mr. Sheehan, Legislative Director of the United Steelworkers); Hearings on H.R.
843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294, and H.R. 13373 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 135-38
(1969) (testimony of Secretary of Labor Shultz and Solicitor Silberman); id. at 1010-
12 (comments of Rep. O'Hara); cf. H.R. RP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 53,
55, 59-60 (1970) (minority report).
139. Hearings (Senate), supra note 138, at 88; Hearings (House), supra note 138, at
136.
140. See Atlas Roofing 1000. While remarks by at least one member of Congress
clearly indicated a desire to use civil sanctions to make certain that offenders were
punished, Remarks of Senator Dominick, supra note 51, floor debate on this issue was
noticeably absent. Atlas Roofing 1000. OSHA's legislative history is strikingly bare
compared to the legislative histories of other statutes where the courts have been able to
find conclusive evidence of remedial or penal intent. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170-84 (1963), where the Court traced the provisions in
question back to 1865 and found in each segment of the legislative history a reaffirma-
tion of congressional intent to employ its power over citizenship to punish draft evaders.
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Mendoza-Martinez requires an objective assessment of OSHA's
penalty provisions.1  The Supreme Court has suggested several factors
which might be useful in such an assessment:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and de-
terrance, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned .... 142
When the OSHA penalty provisions are analyzed using these factors,
serious questions arise as to their constitutionality.
1 43
First, while money penalties do not fit the traditional definition of
an affirmative disability as a legal incapacity,14 such sanctions have
been properly held to constitute a restraint.145  Although they do not
destroy the legal capacity to pursue any particular course of action
(unless, of course, a business is driven into bankruptcy by the penal-
141. Atlas Roofing 1000. Contra, Irey 1 1205. Aside from its misplaced reliance on
Stranahan, compare frey 1 1204 with notes 112-36 supra and accompanying text, the
Third Circuit panel's decision in frey is objectionable because of its misunderstanding of
the mandate of cases like Mendoza-Martinez which require the courts to look behind the
label attached by Congress to determine conclusively the actual congressional purpose
in providing a sanction. See notes 105-116 supra and accompanying text. Although
it gives lip service to the principle that "the label attached by Congress does not preclude
judicial review of a statute which transgresses a constitutional right," frey 1 1204, the
court provides no hint of how to determine when a constitutional right has been trans-
gressed. It merely accepts the legislative label. See id. at n.9.
142. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (citations omit-
ted). It should be emphasized that these factors will rarely all point in the same
direction, id. at 169; Atlas Roofing 1010-11, and that the list is not exhaustive.
143. McClintock & Bohrnsen, supra note 112, at 382-93; Comment, supra note 20, at
437-44; Note, supra note 137, at 228-34. Contra, frey 1 1204; Atlas Roofing 999-1002,
1009-12. While the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Atlas Roofing went beyond that of the
panel decision in Irey, see note 141 supra, by recognizing that neither legislative history
nor legislative classification provided the conclusive evidence necessary to establish the
constitutional purpose of OSHA's penalty provisions, compare Atlas Roofing 1000 with
trey 1 1204-05, the decision is only slightly more instructive since the court confined
itself to a superficial inquiry, according deference to congressional expertise each time
the Mendoza analysis required an investigation of the actual purpose in providing the
penalties. See notes 149, 173 infra and accompanying text.
144. Atlas Roofing 1001.
145. Id.; United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 564 (E.D. La.
1974); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972); cf. United
States v. Krapf, 180 F. Supp. 886, 887-90 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.
1961).
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ty), money penalties obviously restrain a business from pursuing its
goals by diminishing its resources.14 6 This conclusion applies to all of
OSHA's money penalty provisions, 147 since courts have traditionally
attached little significance to the severity of a penalty in determining
whether it imposes disabilities or restraints.148
Second, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the kinds of
money penalties established in OSHA have historically been considered
penal.' 4  Money fines are commonly employed by the criminal law as
an alternative to incarceration and continue to be regarded as a form of
punishment.'5" While it is true that monetary sanctions have been
accepted by the civil law where Congress' discretionary authority is
deemed absolute,' 5 ' such civil fines have otherwise normally been reject-
ed unless they have a legitimate remedial purpose.152  The recipient of
OSHA penalty proceeds, the Government, 53 is obviously uninjured by
an OSHA violation. Violations under the Act may harm an employee,
but the only injury to the Government is the affront to its role as
sovereign. It is precisely this sort of wrong that has traditionally been
redressed by the penal sanction.' 54
With respect to scienter, OSHA distinguishes between two types of
knowledge in determining the appropriate penalty for a particular viola-
tion. Imposition of the Act's maximum penalty of $10,000 for willful
146. But see Telephone News Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621
(N.D. Ill. 1963), discussed at notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
147. Atlas Roofing 1000; McClintock & Bohrnsen, supra note 112, at 388-89;
Comment, supra note 20, at 440-41.
148. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614, 616 n.9 (1960).
149. See McClintock & Bohrnsen, supra note 112, at 389; Comment, supra note 20, at
441; Note, supra note 137, at 231-32. But see Atlas Roofing 1001. The suggestion by
the Fifth Circuit that the historical factor is inconclusive because civil penalties have
been accepted where they serve a remedial function is indicative of the court's refusal to
follow the thrust of the Mendoza-Martinez inquiry. The whole purpose of the Mendoza-
Martinez analysis is to determine whether a legitimate remedial purpose can be rationally
assigned to the sanction at issue. See notes 77-111 supra and accompanying text. While
Atlas Roofing is correct in pointing out that remedial mbney penalties have historically
not been considered punishment, this is irrelevant unless such an effect can be attributed
to the OSHA sanctions.
150. Money fines were used as a form of punishment long before incarceration, which
is a relatively new penal sanction. N. KrTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT:
DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 16-17 (1971). Modern statutes commonly provide
for fines as an alternative to imprisonment. Atlas Roofing 1001.
151. See notes 112-32 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 74-81 and 97-111 supra and accompanying text.
153. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1970).
154. See Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: Its Role in
Civil Litigation, 28 Sw. L.J. 999, 1005 (1974); note 69 supra and accompanying text.
See also Note, supra note 137, at 232.
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violations155 requires a showing of actual knowledge or reckless disre-
gard of the prohibited conduct.156 Actions to impose penalties for
serious' 57 and non-serious violations'58 are vulnerable to the tort-type
defense that the exercise of reasonable care would not have made the
violation apparent to the employer.' 9  None of OSHA's provisions
imposes strict liability. 60
The requirements for imposing the sanction for willful violations
are identical to the conventional scienter element of a crime. To prove
a willful violation, the government has the burden of establishing delib-
erate defiance or reckless disregard of the Act,'' much as it has the
burden of establishing criminal intent as an element of more traditional
crimes.'5 2  This factor weighs heavily against the argument that the
sanction for willful violations is remedial.6 3
The highly punitive nature of OSHA's civil penalty for willful
violations is particularly clear when its relationship to the Act's criminal
sanctions is considered. Where a willful violation causes an employee's
death, OSHA authorizes the institution of formal criminal proceed-
ings. 54 Willful violations can, however, also be handled administra-
tively under section 666(a), whether or not the alleged violation
results in a fatality.'5 5 It is obvious that a finding of "willfulness" is
155. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970).
156. Irey 1 1206-07.
157. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970).
158. Id. § 666(c).
159. Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975) (both serious and nonser-
ious violations held to require knowledge).
160. See id.; Atlas Roofing 1001. But see Comment, supra note 20, at 441-42.
161. Irey 1 1207.
162. See generally R. PEPRKNS, supra note 70, at 743-47.
163. Cf. Irey I at 1204. But see Atlas Roofing 1001-02. The Fifth Circuit's careful
refusal to set forth a view on the nature of willful violations was an implicit recognition
of the importance of the scienter issue in identifying penal sanctions. See id. at 1002
n.39. While nonwillful violations do not satisfy this test, it should be noted that the
scienter element is not always necessary to classify a sanction as penal. See, e.g., Helwig
v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1903) (two penalties for identical conduct, one
with and one without scienter, both held penal). See also McClintock & Bohrnsen,
supra note 112, at 389.
164. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1970).
165. See id. § 666(a); Atlas Roofing 1009. It should be noted that the ob-
jection presented here is not to the retributive effects of the criminal penalties which
provide incarceration for behavior that could be punished only by a fine had a death not
resulted. This objection, which has been raised by other commentators, see, e.g.,
McClintock & Bohrnsen, supra note 112, at 390; Comment, supra note 20, at 442, was
properly rejected by the Fifth Circuit in its consideration of OSHA, Atlas Roofing 1002
n.41. The problem is not that different harms can result in different penalties, but that
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more likely under civil law standards of proof than when a jury is
required to reach that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. 66 In
fact, a business may be better off defending a charge under the criminal
section so that constitutional protections would be clearly available. 6 '
Since they are not subject to imprisonment,'6 8 corporate defendants
have no greater vulnerability under the criminal law than they do under
civil sanctions. They are faced with the same punishment in both
instances, but are deprived of important procedural protections in the
civil context. 69
Moreover, much of the behavior made punishable under OSHA is
already a crime in that it is punishable under criminal provisions of
housing and safety codes in many cities and states. 7 ' It is unfair to
dismiss this position, as has the Fifth Circuit, as the untenable conten-
tion that the treatment of certain behavior by other governmental units
limits Congress' election of sanctions."7 ' The Mendoza-Martinez test
should function to weed out civil sanctions established to punish behav-
ior that is already prohibited by criminal provisions which are difficult
to enforce. The attitudes of other units of government are suggestive of
the community's attitude toward the behavior in question. Behavior
which is morally condemned by the community has traditionally been
viewed as falling within the province of the criminal law.1 2
Finally, there remains the issue of whether OSHA's money sanc-
tions can be rationally connected to any purpose other -than punish-
the same harm can result in different penalties at the whim of the Secretary of Labor.
See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
166. The potential for abuse in such a statutory scheme should be stressed. In Irey I,
for example, suit was brought under § 666(a) despite the undisputed fact that an
employee had been killed as a result of the alleged violation. Irey 1 1201. The issue of
willfulness was contested, however, and it was undoubtedly apparent to the government
that a favorable holding was more likely in an administrative proceeding where a jury
would be unavailable and the standard was one of preponderance of the evidence, than
in an article III court where a criminal jury would have been required to resolve the
issue with reference to the more stringent "beyond-reasonable-doubt" standard. Cf.
Atlas Roofing 1002-1011.
167. Irey 1 1204; Comment, supra note 20, at 443.
168. Atlas Roofing 1009; United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th
Cir. 1971).
169. frey 1 1204; Atlas Roofing 1009-10.
170. See Comment, supra note 20, at 441 n.150. See also McClintock & Bohrnsen,
supra note 112, at 389.
171. Atlas Roofing 1010.
172. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text; cf. District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scoyr, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW 9-10 (1972); R. PEmNs, supra note 70, at 11.
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ment.' 7 3 The apparent purpose of OSHA's civil penalties supports their
classification as penal. 17 14 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a non-
penal purpose that is served by the sanctions provided by the Act.
Penalties are assessed according to the gravity of the violation and other
criteria typically considered in imposing criminal sanctions.' 7 5 The fines
are imposed, after the fact, for violations which have already occurred.
They do not compensate anyone for any injury resulting from the
violations and do not act to remove any hazard. In short, the only
purpose of the Act's penalties for willful and non-willful violations is to
punish the employer for permitting a hazard to exist.17 6
Furthermore, retributive aims are evident, particularly in the Act's
sanction for willful violations. If the goal of the Act, as the Secretary of
Labor contends, is "to encourage compliance with" regulations, 77 it is
difficult to understand why a higher penalty is required for willful -than
for non-willful violations when the same threat to public safety has
173. The difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's approach in Atlas Roofing, see note 143
supra, is most apparent in its refusal to attempt to determine any purpose other than
punishment that may rationally be ascribed to the OSHA penalty provisions. See Atlas
Roofing 1010. According to the court, the judiciary is unqualified to examine the
appropriateness of particular sanctions in achieving the purposes of the Act. Id. See
also Irey 1 1205. While this judicial respect for the legislative body's superior capacity
to design solutions for social problems is laudable, the courts cannot avoid all scrutiny of
the legislative inquiry. Congress may determine that a purely punitive civil sanction is
the method best calculated for achieving a particular purpose, but that will not make the
method constitutional. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958). A purpose other than
punishment must be rationally ascribable to the sanction before it may be deemed
nonpenal. Id. at 96. In order properly to divine the nature of a sanction, the courts
must look to the statute to determine the evident purpose of the legislature.
174. Authority for this approach to the statutory purpose is found in two cases in
which the Court stressed that labelling cannot obscure the true intent of an act. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (expatriation after court-martial for desertion in time
of war held to be a punishment); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295
(1935) (provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, providing for a "special income tax"
of $1,000 on retail liquor dealers acting in violation of state or municipal law and
imposing fines and imprisonment for failure to pay the special tax, held to be a penalty
which could not be converted to a tax by mere labelling).
175. Comment, supra note 20, at 442; see Atlas Roofing 1002; Note, supra note 137,
at 232. In assessing penalties, the OSHRC is required by statute to give "due considera-
tion to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the
employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and
the history of previous violations." OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970). See also United
States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 564 n.11 (1974) (commenting
that provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, similar to those found in
OSHA, resembled criteria for criminal sentencing).
176. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 109-10 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring),
quoted in text accompanying note 111 supra. Contra, Irey 1 1203-06; Atlas Roofing
1011.
177. Atlas Roofing 1002.
Vol. 1976:7231
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
occurred.' Surely the extent of a hazard does not depend on whether
it is the result of willful or merely negligent conduct. The effect of
murder does not differ from that of manslaughter. The different penal-
ties associated with the two crimes are merely the result of a sense that
the perpetrator of one is less culpable than that of the other. Society
seeks greater retribution for deeds that it senses are more wicked. 179
This desire for retribution is the only credible aim of the higher penalty
for willful violations.
It is possible, however, to assign a legitimate purpose to section
666(d) which authorizes a maximum penalty of $1000 per day for
failure to comply with an OSHRC abatement order."8 ' The aim of this
provision differs greatly from that of OSHA's other civil penalties. The
violation already exists. A penalty for non-abatement is virtually the
only means available to coerce the violator to rectify the situation. The
effect of such a sanction is to coerce the violator to comply with
regulations, much as penalties for civil contempt are designed to coerce
a party into complying with a court order.18' Rather than deterrence,
the aim of section 666(d) is to remedy an ongoing wrong, a valid
function of the civil law.18 2
178. Compare OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970) (maximum penalty of $10,000 for
serious violation), with id. §§ 666(b)-(c) (maximum penalty of $1,000 for nonserious
violations). The large size of the section 666(a) penalty also brings it into question
under another criterion suggested in Mendoza-Martinez, "whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned." 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
179. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 140 (1968).
180. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970).
181. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text. The fact that the benefit of non-
abatement does not accrue to any specific individual does not detract from the remedial
nature of the civil fine for non-abatement nor from the similarity between those fines
and sanctions for civil contempt. OSHA's civil penalty for non-abatement typifies the
kind of administrative sanction envisioned by Professor Schwenk, see notes 102-04 supra
and accompanying text. The purpose of the sanction is to coerce a violator into
compliance, not to deter a potential violator as is characteristic of the criminal law.
Enforcement by the government is appropriate where, as here, the purpose of a
sanction is to remedy a hazard before an actual injury occurs. Clearly, few individuals
could afford the expense of litigating an OSHA violation before the fact of injury. Men-
doza-Martinez clearly contemplates government enforcement of such nonpenal regulatory
schemes. See notes 97-111 supra and accompanying text.
182. The Third Circuit has explicitly recognized the validity of civil penalties like
section 666(d), which are designed to coerce compliance with regulations. In Irey I, the
three-judge panel explained that "a deliberate and conscious refusal to abate a hazardous
condition may bring about a situation where a heavy civil penalty might be needed to
effect compliance with safety standards." Irey 1 1204.
The problem with Irey I is that the court appeared to apply this principle to the
provision sanctioning willful violations, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970), a provision condi-
tioned on the willful violation of the Act, not on a refusal to abate a hazard. The large
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SEVENTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
Even when it is determined that imposition of a statutory sanction
does not require the procedural protections associated with the criminal
law, federal administrative adjudications may still be inappropriate un-
less accompanied by some provision for plenary judicial review.183  The
seventh amendment requirement that "the right to trial by jury. . . be
preserved" in significant "[s]uits at common law"'t plates an impor-
tant limit on the extent to which civil penalties can be administratively
imposed'8 5 without provision for de novo review in district court. 86
Even where Congress has the power to delegate adjudicative authority to
an administrative agency, the seventh amendment may restrict the use of
such a forum as a finder of fact when the issue in controversy is in the
nature of a suit at common law.18 7
The seventh amendment right to trial by jury represents a constitu-
tional decision concerning "the preferable mode of disposing of issues of
penalty is designed to deter conduct by punishing its occurrence. The sanction for
non-abatement is a method of coercing compliance.
183. It should be stressed from the outset that the seventh amendment right to trial
by jury affects only federal administrative schemes since the Court has consistently
refused to apply the seventh amendment to the States. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R.
v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). It should be noted, however, that many state
constitutions have similar provisions protecting the right to trial by jury in some or all
civil cases, e.g., ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 13; PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; VA. CONSr. art. I, § 11,
and that the resolution of the seventh amendment issue for the federal courts may take
on added significance since the states frequently look to Supreme Court constructions of
constitutional provisions in construing analogous provisions of their own constitutions.
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
184. U.S. CONsr. amend. VII requires that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved ....
185. L JAFFE 90-91; see Irey 11 1219; K. DAvis § 2.12; J. MOORE 38.11[7] at 128;
Note, Application of Constitutional Guarantees of fury Trial to the Administrative
Process, 56 HAnRv. L. REv. 282 (1942). See also J. MooRE at 38.08[5] at 87; id.
38.37[3] at 308.4. See authorities cited at note 203 infra.
186. If the seventh amendment does require that trial by jury be available, only a
plenary trial in district court will satisfy that requirement. See L. JAFFE 90. Contra,
Irey II. This has been the thrust of the recent seventh amendment challenges to OSHA,
which were directed not to the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission's
adjudicatory powers, but to the fact that the only judicial review which the Act permitted
of the administrative agency's factual findings was limited by the substantial evidence
test. Irey 1 1215; Atlas Roofing 1011.
187. L. JAFFE 90-91. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J.
655, 656 (1963). Throughout this analysis, a distinction is made between the power to
delegate adjudicative authority and the restrictive effect which individual rights may have
on that power. See generally L. JAFFE 90-92. There is little question, for example, that
OSHA constitutes a legitimate exercise of the commerce power. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(1970); cf. Brennan v. OSHRC, 492 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1974). Seventh amend-
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fact in civil cases at law."""8  The absence of any provision protecting
jury trials in civil cases was one of the most serious objections voiced by
opponents of the original Constitution' 9 who believed that the jury was
an essential guardian of political and civil liberty. 190 The seventh
amendment was designed to act as a check against corruption, arbitrari-
ness, and undue influence of wealth in the courtroom.' 9' Adherence to
the federal policy favoring jury trials 92 is nowhere more important than
where the government is authorized to use the civil law to enforce its
own regulations. 193  In such cases, the amendment's function parallels
that of the constitutional provisions for trial by jury in criminal cases-
prevention of oppressive government regulation.'9 4
The concept of a "suit at common law" is central to any analysis of
the applicability of the seventh amendment. While early cases appeared
to limit the requirement of a civil jury to actions triable under common
law rules as they existed when the seventh amendment was adopted in
1791,1 9t later decisions have made it clear that a statutory right of action
which involves legal rights carries the same seventh amendment guaran-
ment challenges to OSHA have been limited to the ground that the narrow scope of re-
view allowed under the Act abrogates the individual's right to trial by jury, Irey II 1215;
see Atlas Roofing 1011-12, and it should be emphasized that since it is the right to a jury,
not the exercise of power, that is at issue, the mere presence of the judicial power in the
enforcement scheme will not satisfy the amendment. But see Irey II 1214.
188. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959); Dimick v.
Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935).
189. Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152-55 (1973); Galloway v. United States,
319 U.S. 372, 398-99 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 432, 446 (1830); see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 116, at 1231-32.
190. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting);
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 432, 445-46 (1830); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1757 (1833). See also 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *379.
191. Cf. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935), citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *348, *379-80; I. MOORE 1 38.02[1] at 17-18.
192. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959); C. WIanT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTS § 92, at 402-03 (2d ed. 1970).
193. Dean McKay has commented on the enhanced dangers of biased adjudications
by administrative officers who are highly committed to the goals of the administrative
scheme in which they are involved. McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative
Process, 49 IowA L. REv. 441, 442, 473 (1964).
194. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. As a result, the fundamental
issue in applying the seventh amendment to statutory schemes for administrative imposi-
tion of money penalties is analogous to that of the sixth amendment analysis presented
earlier: To what degree may the need for constitutionally required procedures be
undercut by legislative act? See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text. See also
United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D.N.J. 1950), discussed in note 198 infra.
195. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943); Dimick v. Scheidt,
293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935); Note, supra note 185, at 283.
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tee as its common law counterpart.19 6 Where legislation provides for
the enforcement of statutory rights and remedies analogous to those
recognized at common law in "an ordinary civil action in district court,"
the seventh amendment requires that a jury trial be made available. 197
Thus, there is little question that any original judicial imposition of a
statutory money penalty will entitle the defendant to trial by jury,
regardless of whether the particular sanction existed at common law in
1791.98
196. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does
apply to actions enforcing statutory rights . . ."); United States v. J.B. Williams, Inc.,
498 F.2d 414, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1974); see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-
76 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970), citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
197. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 193-97 (1974); United States v. J.B. Williams, Inc., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
Several situations should be distinguished. First, if a statute makes specific provi-
sion for trial by jury, the courts must respect that mandate regardless of whether a jury
would have been constitutionally required. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42,
64-67 (1924); J. MOORE 1 38.1211] at 128.24. Second, if a statute is silent on the issue
of trial by jury, the rights of action and proceeding must be analogized to their historical
counterparts to determine whether the Constitution requires that trial by jury be
available. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913); see, e.g., Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). See generally J. MOORE I 38.11[7] at 128.4; id. 1
38.37[3]; 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302 (1971).
According to the recent cases, this determination of whether an issue is of such a
legal nature as to require a right to trial by jury depends on a consideration of the
pre-merger custom with reference to such questions, the remedy sought, and the prac-
tical abilities and limitations of juries. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10
(1970); Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1972), affd sub nom.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). If any legal claim is presented, the oppor-
tunity for trial by jury must be afforded regardless of its combination with issues
formerly adjudicated by a court of equity unless grave and unusual circumstances are
presented. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959). See note 230 infra.
A third situation arises where Congress enacts a statutory scheme which provides a
new cause of action and a mode of enforcement that seems to preclude trial by jury. In
this case, the legislation must be examined to determine whether it is violative of the
seventh amendment. J. MOORE 7 38.37[3] at 308.4; see, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Katchen v. Landy, 382
U.S. 323 (1966). Recent cases have clarified the mode of analysis for making this
determination when the litigation is committed to a district court, Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974); see
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974); Note, supra note 45, at
522. However, the approach for cases in which nonjudicial forums are prescribed
remains unclear. The balance of this Comment will present one possible approach.
198. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213
U.S. 103, 115 (1909); United States v. J.B. Williams, Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 422-23 (2d Cir.
1974); J. MOORE 11 38.3111] at 232-33; see Irey 1 1207, 1215 (Gibbons, J., dissenting);
Note, supra note 29, at 547.
An action for a statutory penalty is an action for debt, and as the district court
explained in United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950):
. . . [an] action does not lose its identity merely because it finds itself en-
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De Novo Review and the Seventh Amendment
The more difficult seventh amendment issue concerns the constitu-
tionality of legislative schemes which preclude jury resolution of factual
disputes by delegating adjudicative responsibility to administrative offi-
cials.10 Some authorities seem to have relied on the notion that trial by
jury is incompatible with the concept of administrative adjudication to
argue that all proceedings before an administrative agency are exempted
from the seventh amendment. 00 While this "administrative proceeding
exception" may be defensible when the question is whether an adminis-
trative forum must employ a jury as a finder of fact,21 it cannot justify
the complete derogation of the constitutional right to a civil jury in
common law cases.20 2 The seventh amendment is an important con-
straint on the kinds of civil actions that can be resolved conclusively by
administrative officers.20 3 When an administrative sanction is in the
meshed in a statute. The right to trial by jury in an action for debt still pre-
vails whatever modem name may be applied to the action. To hold otherwise
would open the way for Congress to nullify the constitutional right of trial byjury by mere statutory enactments. Id. at 986.
199. See, e.g., OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 660 et seq. (1970). See note 11 supra. Largely
because of the lack of such schemes, see note 5 supra, this issue has rarely been analyzed
by the courts and does not appear to have been authoritatively resolved except in a few
narrow situations. For example, it seems clear that the Government and another party
can agree in contract to give an administrative agency final authority to impose penalties
that are in the nature of liquidated damages. See note 89 supra; see Irey 1 1214 n.10
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). Similarly, the liquidated damages theory may give an admin-
istrative agency authority to impose penalties on its licensee as a condition of the license.
See note 90 supra. It should be emphasized, however, that such powers are unrelated to
the kinds of money penalties present in OSHA where the Government has no specific
prior relationship with a particular business. The power of some agencies to deny or
revoke a license-a privilege which is regulated on behalf of Congress-is quite distinct
from the power to impose a penalty on any member of the public. See L. JAFFE 111. But
see Atlas Roofing 1012.
Finally, it should be noted that the "exclusive power" doctrine established in
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909), see notes 117-33
supra and accompanying text, may also serve to exempt some administrative sanctions
from the seventh amendment. See Irey 1 1209-12 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Note, supra
note 30, at 548-49 nn.47-49. Stranahan, however, would appear to be distinguishable
since it was decided under admiralty jurisdiction, see Irey I 1208-11 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
200. See generally Atlas Roofing 1011; Irey 1 1216-17; Note, supra note 185, at 282.
Professor Jaffe's comment that "the concept of expertise on which the administrative
agency rests is not consistent with the use by it of a jury as fact finder," L. JAFFE 90, has
been frequently cited by the courts and commentators. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 194 n.8 (1974); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAv. L. Rnv. 1109, 1267 n.390 (1971).
201. See Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1974); Note,
supra note 30, at 544. See also L. JAFFE 90.
202. See Irey 1 1213 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); irey IH 1225 (Gibbons, J., dissenting);
L. JAFFPE 90; Note, supra note 185, at 282.
203. Most commentators and judges would agree, for example, that the seventh
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nature of a suit at common law, the seventh amendment mandates jury
determination of the fact of wrongdoing before a penalty can be im-
posed.2 °4 In most cases, the amendment can be satisfied by provision
for de novo review in district court, with only negligible effects on the
efficacy of the particular regulatory scheme."0 5 Unfortunately the
courts have not been attentive to developing a sound test for determining
when the seventh amendment must be applied2 °
Equitable Remedies
Many of the cases which have been cited in support of an adminis-
trative proceeding exception to the seventh amendment provide little
guidance, since they present situations which are so clearly outside the
amendment would prohibit Congress from establishing a National Torts Claim Board to
adjudicate all tort actions under federal jurisdiction, subject to only limited judicial
review. See Irey H 1219, 1220-22 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); K. DAVIs § 2.13; L. JAFFE
90; J. MooRa 38.11[7] at 128-128.1; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362,
1375 (1953); James, supra note 187, at 655-56; Developments in the Law, supra note
200, at 1267 n.391.
204. A suit for a statutory penalty, for example, has historically been covered by the
common law action for debt. See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47 (1914);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909); United States v. J.B. Williams, Inc.,
498 F.2d 414, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1974); J. MooRE 38.11[7] at 128.2; Note, supra note
30, at 547. The common law analogy and the seventh amendment's protections may not
be diminished simply because Congress chooses to so legislate. See United States v.
Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D.N.J. 1950), discussed at note 198 supra. See also frey 1
1213; Irey 1f 1222 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
In frey I, Judge Gibbons focused on the summary district court action to collect
a civil money penalty under OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1) (1970). See note 30 supra.
As another commentator has recently noted, this focus is misguided since a suit to
execute a penalty may normally be disposed of summarily without a jury. Note, supra
note 30, at 547. It is the original OSHA penalty proceeding that is analogous to the
common law action for debt, and for that action to be conclusive, there must be an
opportunity for trial by jury.
205. Even where provided, trials de novo are rarely sought, Irey 1 1205 n.l1; H.
GoLDscHMm 899; L. JAFFE 99, 113. Yet the mere fact of their availability would appear
to satisfy any seventh amendment objection. Irey 1 1215; L. JAFFE 99; see frey 1 1205
n.l 1.
206. See, e.g., frey II, where the Third Circuit held en banc:
There is a line beyond which Congress may not transfer traditional reme-
dies from the courts to administrative agencies so as to evade the protection
of the Seventh Amendment. As so often with constitutional adjudications,
such a point need not be defined with precision to cover all cases for all time.
We only decide the case before us, and, as the panel previously held, that line
has not been crossed in this case. Irey 1 1219 (footnote omitted).
See also Atlas Roofing 1011-12. The dissent in frey If exposed the problems inherent in
such a position:
[H]ow do we know the line has not been crossed if we are not told where
it is? What neutral principle was brought to bear in deciding that this case
fell on the permissible side of the invisible line? Irey 11 1221 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
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common law that trial by jury would not have been required even if the
statute had prescribed adjudication in a district court.207 In Guthrie
National Bank v. Guthrie,2"" for example, the claims which the Okla-
homa territorial legislature had established its special commission to
adjudicate were purely equitable and therefore clearly outside the trial
by jury guarantee of the seventh amendment. 0 The case merely
stands for the proposition that the seventh amendment will not bar
administrative adjudication when the issue to be decided is equitable in
nature.210
A similar rationale underlies the decisions which reject seventh
amendment challenges to administrative and judicial awards of back-
pay.2 ' The Supreme Court and many of the appellate courts have
refused to apply the seventh amendment to a variety of statutory
schemes which permit administrative and judicial officers to render
money judgments at their discretion as part of an equitable remedy
designed to restore the partirs to the positions they would have held had
the statute not been violated. 212  The money award is considered to be
in the nature of restitution, an equitable remedy which does not entitle
the parties to trial by jury.13 Most money penalties, however, are a
necessary consequence of a finding that a violation has occurred and
have no relationship to the wrongful gains or losses of any party.21 4 For
this reason, it is difficult to reject a seventh amendment challenge to an
207. See cases cited in notes 208-19 infra.
208. 173 U.S. 528 (1899).
209. Id. at 537. The commission had been established to determine the validity of
claims against certain municipalities; the claims had no basis in law because the debts
were incurred before the cities had statutory authority to incur debts. Id. at 534.
210. See id. at 536-37; cf. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 n.37 (7th Cir.
1972), afj'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
211. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937);
Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (1971); see cases cited in note 212 infra.
212. E.g., Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (redress for
employment discrimination); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946)
(reimbursement of rents that were excessive under Emergency Price Control Act);
McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199, 202-04 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 934 (1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 417 F.2d 319, 324 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 442-44 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The equitable remedy of restitu-
tion has traditionally been used to restore parties to the status quo. J. MOORE
38.24[2] at 190.5. See generally D. DoBns, supra note 83, § 4.1 (1973).
213. See generally J. MooRE 38.24[2].
214. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442-44 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
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administrative penalty proceeding on the theory that it is an equitable
measure in the nature of restitution.
Another theory that has been offered in support of administrative
imposition of civil money penalties relies on a distinction between purely
private actions and actions infused with a public interest. According to
this argument, an action initiated by a public official may result in a
money judgment without an opportunity for trial by jury when the
action is aimed at the vindication of a "public right."21 5  Besides the
obvious problem of distinguishing between public and private rights,210
the difficulty with this argument is that the "public interest" put forward
to overcome a seventh amendment challenge has uniformly been that of
affording complete relief to the parties by restoring each to the status it
would have held but for the statutory violation. 17  Thus, the money
awards in this line of cases are essentially equitable remedies in the
nature of restitution. 1 8 While it is true that assertion of a public right
may enable Congress to delegate adjudicatory power to administrative
agencies, that jurisdictional argument does not permit Congress to un-
dercut the seventh amendment right to trial by jury in significant cases
at common law.219  Thus, the public right argument may only be used
215. See H. GOLDSCHMID 943; Brief for Respondent at 10, Irey If.
216. At least one court and several commentators have noticed the analytical difficul-
ties in any such distinction. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 n.37 (7th Cir.
1972) (opinion of Stevens, J.), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974);
Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a
Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 517-19 (1973) (also notes the lack of historical
precedent for such a distinction); Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 167, 175-76 (1969); see L. JAFFE 90;
Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. REv. 720 (1946).
217. See, e.g., Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960), quoting
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1946); McFerren v. County Bd.
of Educ., 455 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); Harkless v.
Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991
(1971) (redress of employment discrimination); Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904-05
(5th Cir. 1965) (order to pay withheld minimum or overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act); Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936) (backpay
order under National Labor Relations Act). See also Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110,
1121 n.37 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1974).
218. Compare Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293-96 (1960), and
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1946), with Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974), affg Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972).
219. L. JAFFE 90. It is clear that a public right argument will not overcome a
seventh amendment challenge unless the proceeding is outside the common law. A
public interest will not, in itself, be sufficient to remove an action from the common law.
Id. at 90-91; see Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 n.37 (7th Cir. 1972), affd sub
nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). Some advocates of a broad congressional
power to delegate adjudicative authority to administrative agencies may have confused
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to support a broad use of equity powers in suits for restitution-suits
which are quite distinct from actions for civil penalties.
Administrative Proceedings and the Seventh Amendment
Much of the dispute over the applicability of the seventh amend-
ment to legislation which provides for administrative imposition of
money penalties centers around language in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co. 22 0  In that case, the petitioning steel company challenged
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935221 which au-
thorized the NLRB to couple an award of backpay with a reinstatement
order.22 2  While the thrust of the attack on the statute was directed at
the Act's validity as an exercise of the commerce clause,223 the challenge
did include a seventh amendment argument that an award of backpay is
equivalent to a money judgment and requires provision for trial by
jury.224 The Court rejected the seventh amendment argument on two
grounds: first, the award of backpay was merely incidental to the
equitable relief-reinstatement-that was the gravamen of the action;
this distinction between the jurisdictional and seventh amendment consequences of a
"public right." See, e.g., H. GOLDSCHMID 943.
It should be noted that the case which first suggested the public right doctrine,
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1855), did so in the context of a discussion of equitable rights and remedies. Mur-
ray's Lessee involved Congress' power to authorize executive officers to put a lien
on the properties of a tax collector who, after an accounting, was found unable to
transmit the sum he had collected to the U.S. Treasury. See Irey 1 1211 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting); L. JAFFE 88-90. While a seventh amendment argument had been asserted,
59 U.S. at 273, it was not discussed by the Court. See Irey 1 1212 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). This may have been because of a standing problem stemming from the fact
that the suit was brought not by the tax collector, but by remote successors to his title in
certain lands, or because the seventh amendment challenge was not taken seriously since
the case dealt in essence with "[t]he enforcement of the duty of a fiduciary to account,"
an equitable right historically outside the scope of the seventh amendment. Id. Judge
Gibbons also distinguished Murray's Lessee from cases treating in personam judgments
as civil money penalties because the case dealt with what was essentially an in rem
proceeding-execution of a tax warrant on the tax collector's property. Id.
220. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The dispute over the rule of Jones & Laughlin, see notes
225-27 infra and accompanying text, is epitomized in the conflict between the majority
and dissenting judges in Irey H. Compare Irey 11 1216-17 with Irey II 1221-24
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) and id. at 1226 (Gurth, J., dissenting). Also compare Irey I at
1205 n. I1 with id. at 1209-15 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
221. Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151 etseq. (Supp. III, 1973)).
222. Id. § 10(c), 49 Stat at 454.
223. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 13-19, 29-41 (1937). It is
difficult to believe that the Supreme Court intended Jones & Laughlin to create an
important exception to the seventh amendment, since it saw fit to dispose of the issue in
only one page of a 49-page opinion. See Irey 1 1224 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
224. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
[Vol. 1976:723
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
and second, the proceeding was a "statutory proceeding" "unknown to
the common law."22 5
The difficulty with Jones & Laughlin is that the scope of its holding
is unclear. The opinion may be read broadly as presenting the rule that
the seventh amendment simply does not apply to any statutory scheme
in which Congress has specifically provided for administrative adjudica-
tion.21 6 On the other hand, the case may be read for the narrower
principle that the amendment does not apply to an administrative pro-
ceeding in which the award of backpay is part of a scheme of equitable
relief contemplated by statute; in such a situation, the action is not in the
nature of a suit at common law.227
225. Id.; JAFFE 91; Developments in the Law, supra note 200, at 1267 n.388.
226. E.g., Irey II 1216-17; see Atlas Roofing 1011-12; Irey 1 1205 n.11. Such a
reading has found wide acceptance, with its proponents stressing the fact that a
"statutory proceeding" is alien to the common law. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d
1110, 1115-16 nn.15-18 (7th Cir. 1972), affd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974); J. MooRE 38.08[5]; Walker, Title VII: Complaint & Enforcement Procedures
and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. INDus. & COMM. L. Rav. 495, 507-08 (1966); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 200, at 1267-68 n.388; Comment, supra note 47, at
350. This interpretation is particularly plausible given the decision in Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474 (1935) (5-4 decision holding the seventh amendment to be a bar to the use
of additur in the federal courts), decided less than two years before hearing of Jones &
Laughlin. In that case, the majority advanced the rigid theory that the common law as
it stood in 1791 was incorporated in the seventh amendment. Id. at 487. According to
that view, any statutory proceeding would be unknown to the common law and beyond
the strictures of the seventh amendment. See Note, supra note 185, at 283.
227. Irey I i214 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Irey 11 1221-23 (Gibbons, J., dissenting);
id. at 1226 (Garth, J., dissenting) (follows legal reasoning of Gibbons' dissents); Note,
supra note 30, at 548. This interpretation flows from the more flexible position asserted
by the dissenting justices in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (5-4). The Dimick dissent suggested that the common law was not frozen
as of 1791 but had continued to develop and that the seventh amendment would apply to
a new procedure if the matter at issue was analogous to a common law issue. See Note,
supra note 185, at 283. The Dimick minority interpretation is clearly the view of the
seventh amendment which has since been adopted by the Court. See, e.g., Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959). Under this view, the NLRB proceeding would have been examined, the money
damages held incidental to the equitable relief of reinstatement provided by statute, and
the seventh amendment thus held inapplicable. While the recent cases reject this
equitable clean-up doctrine, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962)
(see note 230 infra), it was clearly viable during the period in which Jones & Laughlin
was decided. See generally J. MOORE 38.16[l].
The citation of Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 537 (1899) in
support of the proposition that "[the seventh amendment] does not apply where the
proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common law," NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937), supports this narrow interpretation. Guthrie involved
a special commission set up by the Oklahoma territorial legislature to hear claims against
the town of Guthrie. These claims had no legal force, but the legislature deemed it
equitable to determine their moral worth and honor them where appropriate. 173 U.S.
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The Modern Test: Substantial Necessity
The modern cases suggest an intermediate position. As the Su-
preme Court recently announced in Curtis v. Loether:228
Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition that the Seventh
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings,
where jury trial would be incompatible with the whole concept of ad-
ministrative adjudication and would substantially interfere with [the
agency's] role in the statutory scheme.229
It is unreasonable to believe that this gloss on the holding of Jones &
Laughlin does no more than restate the truism that trial by jury is
incompatible with administrative adjudication. Rather, the interpreta-
tion should be read as a particularization of the modem rule of equity
that characterization of legal claims as incidental or prior to equitable
claims can result in the loss of a right to trial by jury "only in the most
imperative circumstances. '230  The administrative proceeding exception
at 534, 537. Thus the claim and the proceeding established to determine the claim were
equitable in nature and the seventh amendment was held inapplicable. Id. at 537; see
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1115 n.16 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). The same rationale supports the holding in Jones &
Laughlin. In holding that the essence of the NLRB action was equitable and that the
procedure for determining the claim and fashioning the remedy was equitable and outside
the seventh amendment, the Court need not have held all statutory proceedings to be
outside the purview of the seventh amendment. See J. Moonn 38.37[3]; id.
38.11[7] at 128.1.
228. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
229. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
230. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959); see Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-40
(1970).
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen dramatically expanded the jury trial guarantee of
the seventh amendment. J. MooRE i 38.12[1]; 9 C. WiaunT & A. MILLER, supra note
197 § 2302, at 21; see Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537 (1970). Those cases made
it clear that the scope of equity had been diminished by the increased flexibility of the
legal remedies provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Deilaratory
Judgment Act. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 n.19 (1962); Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1959). Since the Federal Rules
allow issues of law and equity to be decided together in one civil action, with the
former decided by a jury, requirements of judicial economy no longer justify equity's
deciding legal issues when it obtains jurisdiction. 359 U.S. at 508-09. Consequently,
the cases required that where equitable and legal issues were joined in a single case,
the right to trial by jury could be lost only in the "most imperative circumstances."
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, at 472-73; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
The Court has never specifically applied Beacon Theatres or its progeny to an
administrative proceeding. Many commentators seem to have assumed that the line of
cases would apply and that the narrow holding of Jones & Laughlin, see note 227 supra
and accompanying text, would simply lose its force. See, e.g., Rogers v. Loether, 467
F.2d 1110, 1118-20 (7th Cir. 1972) (opinion of Stevens, J.), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v.
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to the seventh amendment is limited to these situations where provision
for trial by jury would "substantially interfere" with the administra-
tive agency's role in a statutory scheme-where provision for trial by
jury would be inconsistent with the whole concept of administrative
adjudication as embodied in the legislative blueprint at hand.23' The test
is necessarily a flexible one which must be applied on a case by case
basis. Nonetheless, each administrative scheme which may infringe
upon the seventh amendment must be carefully scrutinized. 232  The
issue is not one of legislative convenience but of substantial necessity to
the efficacy of a statutory scheme.233 In essence, the question is not
whether an administrative law judge must employ a jury as a fact finder,
but whether some sort of review by a court employing a jury would be
destructive bf an entire regulatory design.
This interpretation is supported by the few cases in which the
Supreme Court has sustained the power of Congress "to entrust enforce-
ment of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized court
of equity free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment. 23 4  In
each of these cases, the holding has rested on a judicial determination
that administrative adjudication was substantially necessary to the effica-
cy of the legislative scheme at issue. In Block v. Hirsh,235 for example,
the Court upheld legislation which temporarily established a commission
to regulate the duration and conditions of the possession of rented realty
in the District of Columbia as a reasonable method of dealing with
wartime overcrowding in Washington. 236  A seventh amendment claim
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Developments in the Law, supra note 200, at 1267 n.388.
However, this is not necessarily true. There is no reason to suspect that Beacon
Theatres does not apply to administrative proceedings. The test is whether the problems
which require administrative adjudication constitute the imperative circumstances needed
to satisfy the mandate of Beacon Theatres. See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974).
231. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
232. As the Supreme Court explained in Beacon Theatres: "'Maintenance of the jury
as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history
and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be
scrutinized with the utmost care.'" 359 U.S. at 501 (1959), quoting Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
233. Note, supra note 185, at 294; see Note, supra note 30, at 550.
234. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.
323 (1966); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Guthrie Nat'l
Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899); see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363,
382-83 (1974), citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
235. 256 U.S. 135 (1921), sustaining Act of October 22, 1919, ch. 80, tit. II, 41
Stat. 297 (1919).
236. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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to trial by jury was rejected,23 7 despite the fact that an action to recover
possession was clearly recognized at common law.2 38  The Court rea-
soned that the power to decide the facts which affected the landlord-
tenant relationship was so inseparable from the authority to regulate that
relation that the seventh amendment could not restrict the commission's
adjudicative authority once its power to regulate the relation was estab-
lished.230  The power to resolve issues of fact was deemed necessary to
the efficacy of the legislative scheme.
More recently, a similar analysis was conducted in Katchen v.
Landy240 in which the Supreme Court rejected a seventh amendment
challenge to a bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction to order the
surrender of a voidable preference. 241 Though it clearly recognized that
the essentially legal issue of preference would normally entitle a party to
trial by jury in a court of law,242 the Court refused to require the
bankruptcy court to defer judgment until the creditor could complete a
plenary proceeding in district court.24 3  Rather, the Court held, the
situation disclosed the kind of imperative circumstances which permit a
court of equity to resolve all issues before it even though the results
might be dispositive of a legal claim which would otherwise entitle the
237. Id. at 157-58.
238. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 371-74 (1974) (demonstrates the
common law nature of suits for possession).
239. 256 U.S. at 158. Recently the Supreme Court has discussed the effect of Block
in language almost identical to its statement of the rule of Jones & Laughlin:
Block v. Hirsh merely stands for the principle that the Seventh Amendment
is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would
be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication. Pernell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974).
Compare id. with Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (stating the rule of Jones
& Laughlin), set out in full in text accompanying note 229 supra.
This analysis of Block helps clarify the dictum from Perell v. Southall Realty, 416
U.S. 363 (1974), where the Court suggests "that the Seventh Amendment would not be a
bar to a congressional effort to entrust landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the
right to possession, to an administrative agency." Id. at 383. The Court is simply
reaffirming the principle that legislation can establish an administrative agency to
examine and alter common law relationships. Where the ability to adjudicate and
enforce such quasi-legislative determinations of the relationships between parties is
necessary to the success of the legislative scheme, the seventh amendment may not
impede that purpose.
240. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
241. Id. at 325.
242. Id. at 338-39.
243. Id. The petitioner argued that the bankruptcy court should be required to stay
its proceedings and order the bankruptcy trustee to attempt to recover the preference by
a plenary suit under 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970); in such an action, a jury trial would have
been available to the petitioner. See id. at 338.
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parties to trial by jury.244 According to the Court, provision for jury
trials would "dismember" the statutory scheme which Congress had
designed "to secure prompt and effectual administration and settlement
of the estate of all bankrupts in a limited period."2 45  The necessity for
a speedy and complete estate settlement provided the "imperative cir-
cumstances" necessary to extricate the proceeding from the requirements
of the seventh amendment.2 46
Block and Katchen each suggest the kinds of -needs which may
help to justify a scheme for administrative penalty imposition that
precludes an opportunity for trial by jury. The needs of technical
expertise, rapid adjudication, and uniform results based on fluctuating
public demands may all be considered in determining whether to remove
an administrative program from the scope of the seventh amendment.24"
Application of these considerations to administrative imposition of
money penalties is necessarily difficult in the absence of a specific
legislative scheme, but certain general principles can be suggested. First,
civil money penalties must be considered prima facie within the seventh
amendment.2 4s  In personam judgments for civil fines have long been
244. Compare id. at 329 with id. at 338, citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 472-73 (1962).
245. 382 U.S. at 328-29; see D. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 2.6, at 77 n.44 (1973).
246. 382 U.S. at 338-40. See note 230 supra and accompanying text.
247. See note 252 infra. It should be emphasized that no one of these factors will
necessarily be sufficient to move the proceeding into the domain of equity. The
Supreme Court, for example, has made it quite clear that a desire for speed-a factor
frequently cited in support of conclusive administrative adjudication-will only rarely be
sufficient to obviate the need for trial by jury. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363, 384 (1974) ("[Wie reject the notion that there is some necessary inconsistency
between the desire for speedy justice and the right to a jury trial.").
248. But see Irey II 1218. Unwilling to accept that the difference between a civil
penalty payable to the United States and an award of backpay might have constitutional
implications, the Third Circuit refused to accord any significance to the dissenter's
analogy between civil fines and the common law action for debt. Compare id. with id.
at 1222-24 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Irey 1 1208, 1213 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In
part, the Third Circuit's position was the result of a misreading of Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974), which the Irey majority cited in support of the proposition that the
similarity between OSHA's civil penalties and an in personam money judgment obtain-
able only at law was not decisive of the seventh amendment issue. Irey I 1218. While
Curtis did indicate that not all monetary relief would necessarily be characterized as
legal, 415 U.S. at 196, that case strongly suggested that the difference between an award
of backpay as part of an equitable remedy, see notes 211-14 supra and accompanying
text, and other monetary awards that were traditionally offered by courts of law would
be determinative in applying the seventh amendment, 415 U.S. at 195-97; see Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370, 375 (1974) (". . . where an action is simply for the
recovery . . . of a money judgment, the action is one at law." Id. at 370, quoting
Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891)). While it is true that a money
judgment has the same impact on an individual whether it is the result of an equitable
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considered part of the common law notwithstanding their statutory
origins.249 Since they are legal in nature, they may not be upheld under
the rule of Guthrie, which applies only to purely equitable claims. 25 °
Similarly, money fines may not be protected under the restitution
rationale since they have no relationship to any wrongful gain or loss by
any party and are a natural consequence of a wrongful act rather than a
discretionary remedy designed to secure total justice.2 51 Second, in any
given case, the test must focus on the incompatibility of jury determina-
tion of facts with the statutory scheme at issue. Mere convenience is not
a sufficient standard. To overcome a seventh amendment challenge,
preclusion of all opportunity for trial by jury must be necessary to the
success of the statutory scheme. Some evidence beyond the congres-
sional authorization of the challenged procedure must therefore be
presented if the administrative scheme is to be upheld.2"2
award of backpay or an award of a statutory penalty at law, Irey 1 1218, that similarity
has no meaning in the seventh amendment context. The issue is whether "the action
involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather
than in an action in equity or admiralty." Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375
(1974).
249. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.
103, 115 (1909); United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1974);
J. MOORE 38.31[1l at 232-33; see Irey I (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Irey II (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370, 375 (1974).
250. See notes 208-10 supra and accompanying text.
251. See notes 213-14 supra and accompanying text.
252. There are some criteria of general applicability which should be considered in
evaluating any seventh amendment challenge to a scheme for administrative imposition
of money penalties which makes no provision for trial by jury. First, "the use of ad-
ministrative sanctions is justifiable mainly in respect of matters already or typically
committed to administrative supervision and control . . . . The administrative power
to penalize should be an incident of other functions, rather than an activity standing
alone." Gellhom, supra note 92, at 285.
More specifically, the Administrative Conference of the United States has proposed
a set of guidelines for assessing the desirability of allowing administrative agencies to
impose penalties subject to only limited judicial review:
(a) a large volume of cases likely to be processed annually;
(b) the availability to the agency of more potent sanctions with the re-
sulting likelihood that civil money penalties will be used to moderate an other-
wise too harsh response;
(c) the importance to the enforcement scheme of speedy adjudications;
(d) the need for specialized knowledge and agency expertise in the resolu-
tion of disputed issues;
(e) the relative rarity of issues of law (e.g., statutory interpretation)
which require judicial resolution;
(f) the importance of greater consistency of outcome (particularly as to
penalties imposed) which could result from agency, as opposed to district court,
adjudications; and
(g) the likelihood that an agency (or a group of agencies in combination)
will establish an impartial forum in which cases can be efficiently and fairly
decided.
Recommendation 72-6: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, 2 REcommEN-
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Application of the Seventh Amendment to OSHA
This analysis suggests that OSHA's civil penalties for willful12 s and
non-willful violations 254 may not be imposed unless the alleged violator
is given an opportunity for trial by jury.255 While it may be argued that
these money penalties are merely incidental to the OSHA proceeding's
essentially equitable purpose of ordering abatement, 25 the modem cases
make it clear that the right to a jury trial of legal issues cannot be
swallowed up in an equitable proceeding absent some extraordinary
policy needs. 257  OSHA was designed to cope with a difficult problem
on a national scale;2 58 however, neither its legislative history nor inde-
pendent analysis discloses any reason why an opportunity for trial by
jury would be incompatible with the purpose or efficacy of the Act. 9
An opportunity for de novo review in district court is unlikely to
impede the speedy resolution of issues contemplated by the Act. A
wide variety of regulatory schemes presently depends on a de novo trial
for the recovery of civil penalties.26 ° OSHA's procedure of finalizing
DATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMwINSTAm CONFERENCE OF THE UNrriED
STATES 69 (1972).
These factors are consistent with many of the special needs contemplated by the case
law. See notes 234-47 supra and accompanying text. They are also important in efforts
to reduce the inequitable system of penalty settlements which presently results from the
inability of the Department of Justice to act in concert with various administrative
agencies in successfully completing the process of imposing fines on violators through the
courts. See generally H. GOLDSCHMID. It is possible that this problem itself may
constitute a danger to some regulatory schemes which is so severe that conclusive
administrative adjudication of penalties, as in OSHA, is justified.
In general, it will take more than one of the above factors to justify removing a
particular legislative scheme from the scope of the seventh amendment, See note 247
supra.
253. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970).
254. Id. §§ 666(b), (c).
255. Irey I (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Irey II (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Note, supra
note 30, at 550-51. Contra, Irey I; Irey II; Atlas Roofing.
256. Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor on rehearing of Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v.
OSHRC at 12; see Irey II 1219.
Some members of the Third Circuit refused to accept the "incidentar' argument on
its face, finding that recovery of a money judgment was the sole purpose of an OSHA
penalty proceeding. Irey I 1213 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Irey 1I 1222 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
257. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See note 230 supra.
258. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970); Atlas Roofing 1493-94.
259. Irey 1 1205 n.11, 1213-14 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
260. E.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 503, 504 (1970) (FCC); United States v. J.B. Williams Co.,
498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring plenary proceedings to enforce penalties under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. 1I, 1973)).
In fact, very few federal agencies now have authority to impose money penalties
Vol. 1976:7231
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Commission orders whenever a particular step in the review process is
not taken within a specified period2 1' could continue to function to
assure speedy disposition of contested citations without impinging on the
seventh amendment.16 2
More importantly, application of the seventh amendment to these
civil penalty provisions would not interfere with OSHA's primary pur-
pose-the rapid abatement of hazardous working conditions. Under
the Act's present provisions for judicial review, an appeal of a penalty
citation does not stay the OSHRC's abatement order unless such a stay
of execution is specifically ordered by the court.26 3 This procedure
maintains the OSHRC's role as an expert body that is best equipped to
determine when a hazard exists and to invest the time and effort which
will be necessary for abatement. On the other hand, the Commission
has no particular expertise in deciding factual issues such as intent and
reasonable care. These issues, which are fundamental to the imposition
of OSHA's civil penalties, are frequently resolved by juries in other areas
of the law. 264
The OSHRC could, however, retain its authority to order abate-
ment and penalties for non-abatement subject to only limited judicial
review. While the non-abatement penalty does constitute an in person-
am money judgment, its mechanics make it more nearly analogous to a
contempt proceeding 66 than to the traditional suit for statutory penal-
ties, which has historically been considered an action at common law.
The purpose of the non-abatement penalty is central to the Act: it is
designed to encourage remedial action by penalizing refusal to comply
with a binding order. Indeed, when an OSHRC abatement order is
enforced by the courts, it is done through a contempt proceeding with
the penalty for non-abatement being one of the sanctions available to the
court. 26  Since rapid abatement is the purpose of OSHA, and since
without de novo review; most agencies are required to resort to the courts. See note 5
supra.
261. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 659-60 (1970). See notes 31-39 supra and accompanying
text.
262. Such an arrangement would parallel many contemporary schemes of administra-
tive regulation, see note 260 supra, while giving the OSHRC conclusive adjudicative
authority in the vast majority of cases since few individuals ever take advantage of their
opportunity for de novo review. H. GOLDSCHMiD 899 (nearly 90% of all cases involving
administrative penalties make no use of the opportunity for de novo review when it is
available); see Irey I 1205 n.l; L. JAFFE 99, 113.
263. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
264, See W. PROSSER, supra note 71, § 37; cf. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498
F.2d 414, 429 (2d Cir. 1974).
265. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
266. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1970).
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actions for civil contempt do not entitle the accused to trial by jury,267
the seventh amendment does not stand as a bar to administrative adjudi-
cation.
CONCLUSION
The sixth and seventh amendment rights to trial by jury have been
zealously protected throughout the history of the American legal system.
Their function has been to prevent unfair influence of politics, wealth,
and government on the administration of our system of laws and justice.
This policy cannot be easily displaced, no matter how laudable the goal.
Summary administrative regulation undoubtedly has numerous advan-
tages over the slow and often inexpert processes of the courts, but such
practical considerations do not justify the constriction of constitutionally
protected rights.
This Comment has sought to develop a general framework for
determining when a money penalty can be administratively imposed,
subject to only limited judicial review, without violating constitutional
guarantees of trial by jury. The analysis has suggested that the right to
jury trial will not bar administrative adjudication where the purposes of
such procedures are consistent with the objective of administrative
law-attaining prompt compliance with government regulations. As
long as a penalty is designed to attain this compliance by compulsion
rather than deterrence, civil procedure may be appropriate. Use of final
administrative adjudications to impose civil money penalties which are
not equitable in nature should be limited to the enforcement of specific
orders where rapid adjudication is essential to effectuate a legislative
policy.
267. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 64-66 (1924); LDRARY ov CoN-
GRESS, supra note 116, at 609-10; J. MooRE f 38.33[3], at 266.1.
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